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Introduction
Oddly perhaps, my contextual approach to perestroika is framed by three
near-trivial recollections. Two of these contexts, the interplay between
ideology and expediency, and the limits of history to an understanding of
perestroika, I shall offer in a tentative fashion, as my perception is
impeded by question marks to which time alone will provide definitive
answers. The third context is that of constitutional law, within which
many of the changes introduced in the Soviet Union during the past five
years should be, at least formally, intelligible. This context provides the
legal framework of the reforms. The present Article will be confined to the
first context, the interplay between ideology and expediency; it consti-
tutes the first part of a projected trilogy.
I remember a dreary Saturday afternoon in Amsterdam, two winters
ago, when driving rain and approaching darkness convinced me and my
guest, Gennadi Gerasimov, the Soviet spokesman, to abandon our sight-
seeing expedition (after a boat ride on the canals and a quick visit to a
bookstore to buy Dorothy Lessing's recent book on Afghanistan) and to
return to Leiden where Dutch students had invited us for a few drinks
and dinner.
Looking around the crowded dining room, I thought with relief: for
the past three days, not a single kremlinologist or distinguished profes-
sor of this or that in sight; we will have good time. And indeed, Ger-
asimov seemed more relaxed than I had seen him in fifteen years.
Conversation was uninhibited, a model of glasnost':
Q. "Mr. Gerasimov, are you allowed to have a drink with the cam-
paign against alcoholism in full swing in your country?"'
* Professor of Law, Leiden, The Netherlands; LL.B, Licenci6-en-Droit; LL.D.,
Sorbonne.
I. For English translation of the principal normative acts enacted in the Soviet
Union under perestroika to combat drunkenness, see The Legislation of Perestroika: L
Measures to Combat Drunkenness and Alcoholism, 25 Soy. STAT. & DEC., No. 1, at 1-96
(1988).
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A. "This glass of wine will be recorded in statistical surveys as an
increase in the alcohol consumption in Holland; it will help make
the per capita consumption figures in the Soviet Union look better."
Q. "Mr. Gerasimov, the Press Center of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which you head up, is supposed to operate on the principles
of khozraschet, of full cost accounting. How do you manage that?"
A. "Easy. I also manage the Press Center's cafeteria and this allows
me to show an actual profit."
Soon the conversation turned to more serious subjects. With the
recent announcement of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghani-
stan fresh on their minds, the students asked Gerasimov the question
which was to become the subject of endless debates on TV talk shows in
the United States for the next two years: "Does this mean that the
Brezhnev Doctrine is dead?" "Yes," he answered firmly,2 and, leaning
towards me, remarked in a low voice, with a touch of incredulity: "They
still believe that the Brezhnevs need the pretext of a doctrine for march-
ing into Afghanistan or into Czechoslovakia."
Now, it is true that Mr. Gorbachev never mentions expressly the
Brezhnev Doctrine. This is because the Soviet Union never proclaimed
a "Brezhnev Doctrine" and the political justification,3 which Brezhnev
used in invading Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia, and which does imply
adherence to the legal concept of limited sovereignty, was in no way
different from the reasons invoked by Khrushchev in crushing the Hun-
garian uprising in 1956. Khrushchev, however, in his theoretical pro-
nouncements, went considerably farther than Brezhnev and, in his
speech at the All-German Workers Conference in Leipzig, East Ger-
many, on March 7, 1959, looked forward to the total obliteration of bor-
ders within the Communist commonwealth: "[t]he State borders will
disappear, [he proclaimed], as predicted by Marxism-Leninism. ' 4
Brezhnev never went quite so far. Yet no one ever referred to a
Khrushchev doctrine.
But the true significance of Gerasimov's statement, on that rainy
Saturday night in the late winter of 1988, is surely this: Do not always
try to find an explanation, a justification or an excuse in the doctrine of
Marxism-Leninism for the actions and policies of the Soviet leaders;
2. As late as July 1989, N.Y. Times correspondents were speculating whether a
statement by Gorbachev on reduction of short-range missiles did, or did not, imply
rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine. See Markham, Gorbachev Spurns the Use of Force in
Eastern Europe, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
3. For a summary of Brezhnev's arguments in justification of the invasion of
Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, known in the West as the
"Brezhnev Doctrine," see HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER & SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 926-28 (2d ed. 1980).
4. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Speech at the All-German Workers Conference in Leip-
zig (Mar. 7, 1959), reprinted in Pravda, Mar. 27, 1959 (also published in Moscow as a
separate English pamphlet in 1959). The "prediction" was made in Marx's Communist
Manifesto itself: "the working men have no country ... national differences ... are
daily more and more vanishing .. " K. MARX, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, 72-3 (Nor-
ton Critical Edition 1988).
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pragmatism and expediency are often more reliable guides. Does this
apply to Gorbachev and his perestroika as well? Gerasimov, in the inti-
mate surroundings of a student club, would probably have said "yes."
As for myself, I say both "yes" and "no," while abstaining from all value
judgments. Let us consider the elements of expediency and ideology
separately.
A. Perestroika: The Pragmatic Element
When asked if another doctrine has, under Gorbachev, replaced the
Brezhnev Doctrine, Gerasimov quipped, "Yes, we call it 'Now we'll do it
my way.'" He was, of course, paraphrasing the Frank Sinatra song title.
Here, there was a strong hint at Gorbachev's pragmatic bent. And there
is no doubt that many of Gorbachev's reforms were inspired by purely
pragmatic considerations, and the constant changes in the new institu-
tions often obey the dictates of expediency. But only up to a point.
1. The Flexibility of Perestroika and the Constraint of Ideology: The Reform of
Individual Economic [Labor] Activity
It is the nature of perestroika to be a self-renewing phenomenon, relying
on the trial-and-error method, and new decrees, laws and regulations
often replace those published only a few months earlier. Sometimes,
this happens simply because the newly created institution is not quick
enough, or efficient enough to achieve its assigned goal or to register
progress. For example, the Interdepartmental Commission for Ques-
tions of the Application of the New Methods of Planning and Economic
Stimulation, an instrumentality of Gosplan, the state planning agency, 5
was reorganized on December 20, 1985, into the Commission of the
Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers for the Perfecting of Man-
agement, Planning and Economic Mechanism. 6 Motivated by expedi-
ency, it was to be reorganized again, on January 5, 1989, into the
Commission of the USSR Council of Ministries for the Perfecting of the
Economic Mechanism, 7 and again six months later, in line with
Gorbachev's own suggestion, 8 into the State Commission of the USSR
Council of Ministers on Economic Reform, with a Deputy Chairman of
the USSR Council of Ministers as its head. 9 Expediency was the princi-
pal motivation in each case.
5. G. van den Berg, List of Operative Statutes of Soviet Agencies of State Administration,
LAW AND THE GORBACHEV ERA 21-2 (D. Barry, G. Brunner, F. Feldhegge & G. Gin-
sburgs eds. 1988).
6. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1290, Dec. 20, 1985, reprinted in
Izvestiia, Oct. 26, 1986; and 15 EKONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA 7 (1987).
7. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 12,Jan. 5, 1989, SP SSSR 1989,
No. 7, item 19.
8. See Gorbachev, Ob osnovnykh napravleniiakh vnutrennei i vneshnei politiki SSSR [On
the Main Directions of Domestic and Foreign Policy of the USSR] (Report to the First Con-
gress of the People's Deputies of the USSR), reprinted in Izvestiia, May 31, 1989, at 2.
9. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 581, July 24, 1989, SP SSSR
1989, No. 28, item 108, at 662-70.
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Gorbachev's reasons for substantially expanding the scope of eco-
nomic activities permitted to individual citizens 10 were likewise
predominantly pragmatic, including the failure of the public sector to
even come close to satisfying consumer demand: an acknowledged sev-
enty-five percent of the citizens' needs in consumer goods and services
remained unfulfilled." 1 An earlier attempt to "reverse" this process by a
decree that had sought to encourage state enterprises and organizations
to branch out into providing paid services to the population - even
when such activities were not part of the regular or principal occupation
of these enterprises and organizations 12 - proved to be a notable fail-
ure. According to one Soviet legal scholar, only seventeen percent of all
industrial enterprises in the country implemented measures to provide
such services, and even those enterprises limited the benefits of the new
services to their own employees. 13 Gerasimov's cafeteria would proba-
bly fall into this category among the non-industrial organizations.
When the Law on Individual Economic [Labor] Activity was enacted
on November 19, 19 8 6 ,14 the resulting expansion of the "private sec-
tor" was presented not only as an important element ofperestroika, but as
an integral, albeit distinct, part of the Soviet socialist economic system under
Chapter II of the USSR Constitution of 1977.15 Under strong pressure
from the new CPSU leadership, Individual Economic [Labor] Activity
(IEA), hitherto one of the officially most discredited institutions, was
transformed within nineteen months into one of the brightest hopes of
perestroika. This metamorphosis occurred even though it meant the
reversal of decades-long hostility and public mistrust towards the con-
cept of "supplemental income," refusal to regard IEA as a part of the
socialist economy, and frequent discrimination against citizens engaged
in IEA, who were considered "social parasites."
Accordingly, IEA is now characterized as an institution endowed
with vital "social interest," 16 hostility towards the "commodity-money"
character (tovarno-denezhnyi kharakter) of IEA is dismissed as unjustified
10. For English translations of the principal normative acts relating to the reform
of individual non-agricultural economic labor activity under perestroika, see The Legis-
lation of Perestroika: II. Organization of Soviet Economic and Labor Activity, 26 Soy. STAT. &
DEc., No. 1, at 1 (1989).
11. See Trud, May 25, 1984.
12. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 716, On Measures to Expand Paid
Services to the Public by Enterprises and Organizations Whose Principal Activity Is Not the Provi-
sion of Such Services, July 31, 1985, SP SSSR 1985, No. 25, item 128, at 463-66.
13. Kabalkin, Zakon ob individual'noi trudovoi deiatel'nosti - vazhnyi rychag osushchest-
vleniia sotsial'no - ekonomicheskoi politiki [The Law on Individual (Labor) Activity - An Impor-
tant Tool for Implementing Social and Economic Policy], 3 Soy. Gos. & PRAvo 12 (1987).
14. USSR Law No. 6050-XI, Ob individual'noi trudovoi deiatel'nosti[On Individual Eco-
nomic (Labor) Activity], Nov. 19, 1986, Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR 1986, No. 47, item 964,
at 905-14.
15. KONST. SSSR (CONSTITUTION OF THE USSR), arts. 10-18 (1977).
16. Cf Report by I. I. Gladkii, Chairman of the USSR State Committee of Labor
and Social Problems to the USSR Supreme Soviet, Nov. 13, 1986 (introducing the
Draft Law on Individual Economic [Labor] Activity), reprinted in Pravda, Nov. 20,
1986, at 5; and Izvestiia, Nov. 20, 1986, at 5 [hereinafter Gladkii].
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prejudice, and State encouragement of IEA has been pledged in the
form of assistance in obtaining raw materials, tools, and other property,
in the marketing of the IEA output, and through granting credits.17 Tax
rates on IEA income were appreciably lowered.18
A comprehensive new legal system for IEA had to be devised to
replace the virtually complete conceptual and normative vacuum in
which IEA traditionally maintained a precarious existence. Since some
areas of IEA had never been regulated 19 during the preparation of the
new Law on Individual Economic [Labor] Activity and its transformation
into a basic institution ofperestroika, Soviet jurists were guided by a series
of firmly-held priorities. The most important of these priorities was that
IEA was to be treated as an integral part of socialist economy 2 0 and its eco-
nomic and legal nature had to be defined and its status and exercise
regulated in accordance with this axiom.
The second priority was that IEA was to be part of the "second
wave" of perestroika. The "first wave" of reforms consisted of measures
designed to help eliminate negative trends in the development of Soviet
society, including drunkenness, alcoholism and drug abuse, 2 1 erosion of
labor discipline, 22 and the extraction of "nonlabor," i.e., "unearned"
income. 23 The "first wave" also responded to the urgent need to
17. For statutory and other normative acts relating to these questions, see supra
note 10, at items 13 (app. 4 & passim), 14, 18. See also INDIVIDUAL'NAIA TRUDOVAIA
DEIATEL'NOST': SBORNIK NORMATIVNYKH AKTOV [INDIVIDUAL ECONOMIC (LABOR)
ACTIVITY: A COLLECTION OF NORMATIVE AcTs] 129-215 (V. Trynkov comp., P.
Sedugin ed. 1989) [hereinafter Trynkov & Sedugin].
18. See 26 Soy. STAT. & DEC., No. 1, at 73-76; Trynkov & Sedugin, supra note 17,
at 216-58.
19. Cf Gladkii, supra note 16, at 5; Schweisfurth, Die Komplementaritit pers6nlichen
Nutzens und geselschafllichen Interesses - Das Gesetz der UdSSR iber individuelle Arbeitstdtigkeit
vom 19. November 1986 [The Complementarity Between Personal Benefit and Socialist Interest.
The USSR Law on Individual Economic (Labor) Activity of 19 November 1986], 34
OSTEUROPA-RECHT 1, 4, 7-18 (1988).
20. Private entrepreneurial and commercial middleman activity are punished
under article 153 of the RSFSR Criminal Code by deprivation of liberty for a period
of up to five years with confiscation of property or other appropriate penalties. See
RSFSR Law, Oct. 27, 1960, Ved. Verkh. Soy. RSFSR 1960, No. 40, item 591 (as
amended Feb. 1, 1987); Ved. Verkh. Soy. RSFSR 1982, No. 49, item 1821; Ved.
Verkh. Soy. RSFSR 1986, No. 23, item 638. According to article 4 of the 1986 Law,
persons engaged in individual economic labor activity must use "property belonging
to them by right of personal ownership .... " The Draft Law on Property, made
public on Nov. 18, 1989, in article 1 classified personal property as one of the forms
of socialist property. Pravda, Nov. 18, 1989, at 3. See also Kalmykov, Zakon o sobstven-
nosti [Law on Ownership], 42 EKONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA 6 (1988) (Diagram). On indi-
vidual economic labor activity's place in the system of Soviet socialist economy, see
Malein, K razrabotke zakona ob individual'noi trudovoi deiatel'nosti [Toward the Drawing Up
of a Law on Individual Economic (Labor) Activity], 10 Soy. Gos. & PRAvo 2, 31-35 (1986);
Bykov, Kompleks obshchestvennykh otnoshenii, reguliruemykh Zakonom ob individual'noi
trudovoi deiatel'nosti [The Complex of Socialist Relations Regulated by the Law on Individual
Economic (Labor) Activity], 3 VMU 29, 25-33 (1987).
21. See 25 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, pt. A, at 2-96 (1988).
22. See id., No. 2, pt. B, at 5-45 (1988).
23. See id., No. 2, pt. C, at 46-66 (1988).
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improve the quality of goods and services, 2 4 to strengthen "legality,"' 25
and to enact pecuniary sanctions against officials and individuals whose
actions inflicted material damage to enterprises and institutions. 2
6
When the Law on IEA was enacted in November 1986, it was clear that
the edicts and decrees of May andJuly 1986, "On the Intensification of
the Struggle Against Nonlabor Income,"' 27 were more than measures to
deal with one of the "negative trends" in the development of Soviet
society. They were also prerequisites for the subsequent enactment of
the Law on Individual Economic [Labor] Activity. They had to precede the
Law on IEA, firstly in order to make clear the lines of demarcation
between "nonlabor income" and "income derived from individual labor
activity," and secondly, to create an arsenal of stiff penalties in case the
exercise of IEA under the Law of November 19, 1986 (and later also
cooperative activities, under the Law of May 26, 1988),28 degenerated
into "nonlabor activity."'2 9 Also, the expanded scope of permitted indi-
vidual economic labor activities and of the means of production that
could be individually owned, was now matched by a corresponding stiff-
ening of penalties in case of abuse, including the criminalization of
"nonlabor income." 30 Since individual economic labor activity is now
an integral part of the Soviet socialist economy, the "eradication of non-
labor income," even by means of criminal law, is its logical consequence,
since "nonlabor income" is deemed alien to the nature of socialism.
Pragmatism, in the restructuring of Soviet economy, should not be mis-
taken for an abandonment of socialism.
I could go on with other examples, but I believe the conclusion
would remain the same: Pragmatic thinking in the economic sphere
always emerges as a search for new socialist models into which newly-cre-
ated institutions are tentatively integrated.
24. See id., No. 2, pt. D, at 67-91 (1988); No. 3, pt. D, at 1-100 (1989); No. 4, pt. D,
at 1-53 (1989).
25. See id., No. 4, pt. E, at 54-91 (1989).
26. See id., No. 4, pt. F, at 92-123 (1989).
27. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee, 0 merakh po usileniiu bor'by s
netrudovymi dokhodami [On Measures to Intensify the Struggle Against Nonlabor Income], May
15, 1986, SP SSSR 1986, No. 21, item 121, at 373-76; Edict No. 4719-XI of the Pre-
sidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Ob usilenii bor'by s izvlechenien netrudovykh dokhodov
[On Intensifying the Struggle Against Nonlabor Income], May 23, 1986, Ved. Verkh. Soy.
SSSR 1986, No. 21, item 120, at 368-72; Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR 1986, No. 22, item
364, at 369-73; Decree of the RSFSR Council of Ministers No. 329, 0 merakh po
usileniiu bor'by s netrudovymi dokhodami [On Measures to Intensify the Struggle Against Nonla-
bor Income], July 22, 1986, SP RSFSR 1986, No. 20, item 154, at 412-15.
28. USSR Law No. 8998-XI, On Cooperatives in the USSR, May 26, 1988, Ved.
Verkh. Sov. SSSR 1988, No. 22, item 355, at 375-421 [hereinafter Law on
Cooperatives].
29. A "nonlabor activity" involves the hiring of outside labor (which was permit-
ted under Lenin's NEP, but is not under Gorbachev's perestroika), speculation, or
extraction of profits by means prohibited by law.
30. See 26 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at 101-05 (1989). See also 0. IOFFE,
GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC DILEMMA 176-80 (1989).
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2. The Revival of Cooperatives
The mushrooming of cooperatives has become a hallmark of Gorbachev's
economic perestroika, although significant, even if not exceedingly
impressive, growth in the number of non-agricultural cooperatives has
occurred only since the promulgation, on May 26, 1988, of the Law on
Cooperatives. 3 ' Official statistics 32 show that betweenJanuary 1, 1989,
and July 1 of that year the number of such cooperatives in the Soviet
Union increased from 77,548 to 133,000. During the first half of 1989,
the number of individuals working in cooperatives increased from 1.4
million to 2.9 million.33 After registration was ordered for all coopera-
tives and enterprises directly engaged in foreign trade operations in
March 1989,34 a surprising 1,400 producer cooperatives complied with
this requirement by the following September.3 5
The continuing gap between demand and availability in consumer
goods and services is usually cited as the principal impetus to the
proliferation of cooperatives as well as the main reason why coopera-
tives have assumed a new significance in the strategic thinking of Party
and government leaders. Cooperatives are perceived as a potentially
vital instrument in overcoming this weakness in the Soviet economy and,
consequently, as an integral aspect of perestroika.
Economic considerations played a major role in the Law on Coop-
eratives as well as in measures enacted in response to popular criticism
of their activities. These measures include the imposition of price con-
trols in an amendment to the Law on Cooperatives, introduced on Octo-
ber 16, 1989, to bring under control the often exorbitant prices charged
by the cooperatives, as well as other measures intended to curb infla-
tionary pressures.3 6 Nevertheless, in a series of normative acts regulat-
ing the activities of the cooperatives, non-economic and political
measures were resorted to in order to preserve the central government's
role and oversight over the activities of the cooperatives. They include
long lists of restrictions on what the cooperatives may produce, or which
31. See Lau, on Cooperatives, supra note 28. See also Maggs, Constitutional Implications
of Changes in Property Rights in the USSR, 23 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 201, 209 (1990).
32. See 13 EKONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA 14 (1989) (quoting from data compiled by
the State Committee for Statistics of the USSR, 1988); 19 PRAVITEL'STVENNYI VESTNIK
10 (1989) (for the first six months of 1989).
33. 19 PRAVITEL'STVENNYI VESTNIK 10 (1989).
34. Cf Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 203, 0 merakh gosudarstven-
nogo regulirovaniia vneshneekonomicheskoi deiatel'nosti [On Aleasures Assigned to the State in
Regulating Foreign Economic Activities], Mar. 7, 1989, SP SSSR 1989, No. 16, item 50,
implementing Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1405, Dec. 2, 1988, SP
SSSR 1989, No. 2, item 7, at 19-37, and article 28 of the*Law on Cooperatives, supra
note 28.
35. Predpochtenie proizvoditeliu, 42 EKONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA 20 (1989).
36. USSR Law, On Amendments and Additions to the USSR Law, On C'obperatives in the
USSR, Oct. 16, 1989, reprintedin Pravda, Oct. 21, 1989, at 1. See also Sennagoz, TselV-
Sderzhat'rost' tsen'[The Goal - To Halt Price Rises], 26 PRAVITEL'STVENNYI VESTNIK 8
(1989).
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services they may offer, 37 as well as lists detailing what cooperatives may
not export or import.38 Some activities of the cooperatives may be exer-
cised only on the basis of a contract with state enterprises and establish-
ments "for whom such activities constitute their primary functions."3 9
Can Gorbachev's cooperatives still be made intelligible within a
context of ideology? Certainly, although some conclusions point to
innovations in comparison with Stalin and Khrushchev, or end in a ques-
tion mark. There is no doubt, for instance, that cooperatives continue
to be considered ideologically one step above individual economic labor
activity and are entitled to preferential treatment because they are
"more socialist." For example, while all IEA activities that can be law-
fully engaged in by individual citizens are automatically open to cooper-
atives, cooperatives can perform additional tasks not available to
individuals.40
Soon after the IEA Law went into effect on May 1, 1987, and even
prior to the enactment of the Law of Cooperatives, Soviet authorities
began to encourage citizens engaged in IEA to group in cooperatives. 4
1
Article 1(3) of the Law on Individual Economic [Labor] Activity of
November 19, 1986, even declares that the Soviet State encourages citi-
zens engaged in individual economic labor activity to either enter into
contractual relations with State, cooperative or other enterprises, or to
form cooperatives by grouping together with other citizens engaged in
IEA, "following the procedure established by law." To provide incen-
tives, such special cooperatives were declared eligible for government
assistance, special privileges and benefits (including pensions) not avail-
able to individuals working on their own. Even the tax rates for cooper-
atives are more favorable.4 2 Local authorities have considerable
discretion to grant or refuse permits to engage in IEA and to
subordinate authorizations to local economic needs. 43
37. See, e.g., Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1468, 0 regulirovanii
otdel'nykh vidov deiatel'nosti kooperativov ... [On the Regulation of Individual Types of Activi-
ties by the Cooperatives... , Dec. 29, 1988, SP SSSR 1989, No. 4, at 75-79 (with two
schedules).
38. See, e.g., Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1440, On Amendments to
the List of Objects That Are Forbidden for Import and Export, To and From the USSR, Estab-
lished by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 394, of 27 April 1981, Dec. 21, 1989,
SP SSSR 1989, No. 4, item 14, at 84.
39. See Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1468, supra note 37, app.2.
40. Cf A. MAKSIMOVICH, STANOVLENIE I RAZVITIE NOVYKH KOOPERATIvov [FORMA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW COOPERATIVES].
41. Id. at 22.
42. Law of Nov. 13, 1986, article 1, translated in 26 Soy. STAT. & DEC., No. 1, at 39
(1989).
43. See, e.g., Edict No. 8614-XI of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet,
Mar. 14, 1988, Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR 1988, No. 11, item 74, at 182, translated in 26
Sov. STAT. & DEC., No. 1, at 49-50 (1989); Rekomendatsii o primenenii nekotorykh
polozhenii Zakona SSSR "Ob individual'noi trudovoi deiatel'nosti "[Recommendations on Imple-
mentation of Certain Provisions of the Law of the USSR 'On Individual Economic (Labor)
Activity'], confirmed by the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems
and the USSR Ministry of Finance, on Feb. 26, 1987, No. 20-IG, translated & commen-
tary in 26 Sov. STAT. & DEC., No. 1, at 51 (1989).
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Although article 10 of the Law on Cooperatives expressly forbids
government interference in the economic or other activities of a cooper-
ative, this prohibition does not, of course, extend to the cooperative's
activities that it may not lawfully exercise. Among such forbidden activi-
ties is "publishing of works of science, literature and the arts,"' 4 4 as well
as production, exchange, distribution or public viewing of motion pic-
tures and television films. 45
It is interesting to note that in the case of the prohibition against
publishing activities, the authorities have made it a point to invoke eco-
nomic and otherpragmatic reasons for the prohibition, citing such factors
as shortages of newsprint and printing machinery. 4 6 But such pragmatic
arguments continue to coexist with "socialist" considerations, such as
reluctance to allow "commercial competition,"'4 7 and, at lower adminis-
trative levels, with old-fashioned censorship. I am thinking here of the
unsuccessful attempt by a Soviet cooperative to distribute copies of an
already printed new edition of Sigmund Freud's Essays on the Psychology of
Sexuality; the distribution was stopped by the local authorities allegedly
on grounds that "our young people don't need books about Freud." 4 8 I
am willing to give credence to this report, which appeared in the New
York Times, especially after Gennadi Gerasimov told the Dutch students,
in answer to their question, that "No, 'The Last Emperor,' [the motion
picture which was then being shown in Leiden], will not be seen in the
Soviet Union because the commission which decides on such questions
felt that the film contained no social message of interest to the Soviet
people."
In the final analysis, the Soviet authorities are still reluctant to grant
the cooperatives the last word on what their members may watch, read,
or listen to. Nevertheless, in assessing Gorbachev's new cooperatives
from the point of view of the interplay between pragmatism and ideol-
ogy, one should not minimize either the extent of the innovations intro-
duced underperestroika or the daring flexibility of the "socialist economic
model" under Gorbachev. To be sure, it was Lenin himself who had
said that socialism was an association of independent cooperatives and
their members. 49 Under Stalin as well as under Khrushchev of the later
period, the independence of the existing types of cooperatives was, in
44. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1468, Dec. 29, 1988, supra note
37, app. 1, translated in 26 Soy. STAT. & DEC., No. 3 (1990).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Keller, New Ban on Press in Russia; Decision Outlaws Co-ops to Protect State
Monopoly, Int. Herald Trib., Feb. 3, 1988, at 1 (statement by Gennadi Gerasimov);
LrrERATURNAIA GAZETA, Mar. 23, 1988, at I (remarks of M. Nenashev, chairman of
the State Committee for Publishing, Printing and the Book Trade (Goskomizdat)).
47. See Keller, supra note 46.
48. See Clines, Moscow Represses Freud's Slip into Print, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1989, at
Al, col. 2.
49. See Gorbachev, Sotsialisticheskaia ideia i revoliutsionnaia perestroika [The Socialist
Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika], Pravda, Nov. 26, 1989, at 2. See also Smirnov,
Restructuring the "Citadel of Dogmatism", in VOICES OF GLASNOST: INTERVIEWS WITH
GORBACHEV'S REFORMERS 89 (S. Cohen & K. van den Heuvel eds. 1989).
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fact, surrendered in varying degrees to the State, 50 and their very exist-
ence required the express permission of appropriate government agen-
cies. Gorbachev, on the other hand, has added elements to his
cooperatives which undoubtedly go considerably farther than even
Lenin had originally contemplated. I do not refer here merely to the
introduction of such sound economic management techniques as full
economic cost accounting and self-financing, 5 1 or even the leasing of
buildings and equipment, 52 but also to the right of producer coopera-
tives to engage, beginning on April 1, 1989, directly in foreign trade
activities (export and import) and other foreign economic transactions53
(subject to restrictions spelled out in a decree issued in December
1988),5 4 and, more particularly, to the growing scope of objects which
the citizens can acquire in personal ownership. 55 Under a Decree of
December 2, 1988, tenants in state apartment buildings may buy apart-
ments in such buildings, and the tenants may then form a cooperative
which will jointly own the apartment building itself, although the build-
ing must be administered by a state housing authority under a contract
signed with the apartment owners' cooperative. 5 6
To what extent is the Law of Cooperatives still primarily intelligible
in an ideological context?
3. The Law on the State Enterprise ofJune 30, 1987, and Its Fate
The equivocation between pragmatism and ideology in the development
of new institutions recurs constantly, as does the attempt to integrate
the new institutions into the overall framework of the "new socialist eco-
nomic model." This is perhaps best illustrated by the Law on the State
Enterprise of June 30, 1987, which went into effect on January 1,
1988. 5 7 Chapter I, article 1 of the law characterized the new enterprise
as the most fundamental link in the whole new structure of the Soviet
50. See Ioffe, supra note 30, at 103-04; Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 2.
51. See Law on Cooperatives, supra note 28, arts. 14, 17.
52. See Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Enacting Fundamental Principles of Leg-
islation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Leasing [Arenda], Nov. 23, 1989 (with
effect from Jan. 1, 1990), reprinted in Izvestiia, Dec. 1, 1989, at 3. The Decree
repealed the edict of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, On Leasing and Rela-
tionships Based on Leasing, Apr. 7, 1989, Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR 1989, No. 15, item 105
(except clause 18); reproduced in Pravda, Apr. 9, 1989. See also 19 EKONOMICHESKAIA
GAZETA 7-8 (1989) (Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 294, Apr. 7, 1989).
53. See supra note 34. See also 13 EKONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA 21-23 (1989).
54. See supra note 38. See also On Licenses for Export and Import, Pravda, Jan. 28,
1990, at 7.
55. See 26 Soy. STAT. & DEC., No. 1, at 2, n.5 (1989) (examples cited).
56. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1400, 0 prodazhe grazhdanam v
lichnuiu sobstvennost kvartir v domakh gosudarstvennogo i obshchestvennogo zhilishchnogofonda
[On the Sale of Apartments Belonging to State and Public Housing Stocks to Citizens Under
Personal Ownership], Dec. 2, 1988, SP SSSR 1989, No. 1, item 4.
57. USSR Law No. 7284-XI, 0 gosudarstvennom predpriiatii (ob "edinenii) [On the State
Enterprise (Association)], June 30, 1987, Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR 1987, No. 26, item 385
[hereinafter On the State Enterprise]. This law was amended Aug. 3, 1989. See 34 EKo-
NOMICHESKAIA GAZETA 5 (1989); and Edict of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet No. 10277, Ob arende i arendnykh otnosheniiakh v SSSR [On Leasing and Relation-
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economy. "We attach primary importance to the Law on the State
Enterprise in our economic reform," Gorbachev declared, "we use it as
a yardstick for our other steps and measures. We consider them from
the point of view of how fully they conform to this law and contribute to
its practical implementation."5 8
Subsequent to its first enactment, the Law on State Enterprise has
been amended to include many new features, dictated for the most part
by purely economic considerations and pragmatic motives.5 9 These fea-
tures include the leasing of enterprises or their individual components
to workers' collectives and citizens (arenda),60 and the ability to engage
directly in foreign trade and other foreign economic activities.61 Even
more significantly, the law now includes a diversification of the forms of
ownership, highlighted by the introduction ofjoint stock companies and
limited liability companies. 62
But when the step towards a pluralistic concept of ownership was
subsequently consolidated in a new Draft Law on Ownership, intro-
duced in the second session of the Supreme Soviet on November 14,
ships Based on Leasing], Apr. 7, 1989, Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR 1989, No. 15, item 105,
cI. 18. See also supra note 52.
58. M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA: NEW THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY AND THE
WORLD 86 (1989). This characterization has been repeatedly used since in Party Res-
olutions, legislative acts, and in reports by Party and government officials. See, e.g.,
Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Operestroike upravleniia narodnym khoziaistvom
na sovremennom elape ekonomicheskogo razvitiia strany [On the Restructuring of the Management
of National Economy at the Present Stage of the Country's Economic Development], June 30,
1987, Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR 1987, No. 26, item 384 ("Of key importance for the
realization of the envisaged reforms is the adoption of the USSR Law on the State
Enterprise (Association)."). See also On the State Enterprise supra note 57, art. 1.
59. See supra note 57.
60. See supra note 52.
61. See Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Minis-
ters No. 991, 0 merakh po sovershenstvovaniiu upravleniia vneshneekonomicheskimi sviaziami
[On Measures for Improving the Management of Foreign Economic Relations], Aug. 19, 1986,
9 SVOD ZAKONOV (1987), at 48-3; Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1405,
0 dal'neishem razvitii vneshneekonomicheskoi deiatel'nosti gosudarstvennykh, kooperativnykh i
inykh obshchestvennykh predpriiatii, ob"edinenii i organizatsii [On Further Development of For-
eign Economic Activities of State-, Cooperative-, and Other Social Enterprises, Associations and
Organizations], Dec. 2, 1988, SP SSSR 1989, No. 2, item 7, at 19-37; 51 EKONOMICHES-
KA A GAZETA 17-18 (1988); VNESHNIAIA TORGOVLIA, No. 2 (Supp. 1989).
62. See Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1195, 0 vypuskepredpriiatiiami
i organizatsiiami tsennykh bumag [On the Issuance of Negotiable Instruments by Enterprises and
Organizations], Oct. 15, 1988, SP SSSR 1988, No. 35, item 100; Decree of the Council
of Ministers of the Estonian SSR No. 385, Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniia ob aktsionernom
obshchestve [On Confirmation of the Statute on Joint Stock Companies], Nov. 23, 1989, VED.
EsT. SSR 1989, No. 37, item 573, at 898-905 (translated from Estonian); Law of the
Estonian SSR, On Banks, Dec. 23, 1989, VED. EsT. SSR 1989, No. 41, item 647, 1012-
26; Zhagel', Novye banki, novye problemy [New Banks, New Problems], Izvestiia, Jan. 30,
1990, at 1; Fedorov, Ne Birzha, a rynok kapitalov [Not a Stock Exchange, But a Capital
Market], Moskovskie Novosti, Jan. 28, 1990, at 10 (according to the author there are
at present more than 200 commercial and cooperative banks in the USSR);
Romaniuk, Sozdaetsia ynok tsennykh bumag[A Market for Negotiable Instruments Being Cre-
ated], Izvestiia,Jan. 3, 1990, at 1.
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1989,63 article I proclaimed socialist ownership to constitute the foun-
dation of the social-economic system of the USSR. Socialist ownership,
however, was defined as capable of taking on many forms, including that
of personal property. 64 In the Soviet Union, "personal" property is dis-
tinct from private property. The many changes introduced in the eco-
nomic structure of the Law on the State Enterprise, combined with the
diversification of the forms of ownership, in turn required a complete
revision of this law. But when a new Draft Law was introduced in the
Supreme Soviet on October 2, 1989, it was no longer called the Law on
the State Enterprise, but the Law on the Socialist Enterprise. 65 The
socialist model of the economy was deemed compatible with the adop-
tion of so-called traditional "capitalist" techniques.
4. Limiting the Painful Consequences of Transition to a Market Economy
I believe I have made my point! If it is valid, I do not understand the
outcry about a supposed retreat from perestroika from some of the dele-
gates to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR who were meet-
ing in December in a second 1989 session, such as the economist Gavril
K. Popov.66 Nor do I understand the concerns of Western observers
including U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, 67 who seemed sur-
prised that the new blueprint for economic growth was presented by
Prime Minister Ryzhkov in the form of a Five Year Plan, the traditional
Soviet instrument of central economic planning, which failed to yield to
the forces of the free market on such basic positions as subsidies, real
prices, and convertibility of the ruble. These critics have forgotten the
paramount role of pragmatism in the decision-making process under
perestroika.
President Gorbachev has repeatedly acknowledged that, ultimately,
price controls and subsidies must give way to real prices determined by
63. Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Publication of the Draft Law On Ownership
in the USSR, Nov. 14, 1987, (introduced by the USSR Council of Ministers after initial
changes), reprinted in Izvestiia, Nov. 18, 1989 at 1-2, and Pravda, Nov. 18, 1989, at 3.
64. Article 1, Socialist Property in the USSR, provides:
1. The basis of the social-economic system in the USSR is socialist prop-
erty which may take on a variety of forms of social fobshchestvennoi] prop-
erty and personal [lichnoi] property of Soviet citizens.
2. Socialist property comes into being by the joint and individual labor of
Soviet citizens ....
Id. at art. 1.
65. Cf Strategii uglubleniia ekonomicheskoi reformy - novuiu zakonodatel'nuiu osnovu [A
New Legislative Basis for the Strategy of Intensification of Economic Reform] (report by Chair-
man of the Council of Ministers N. Ryzhkov at the Second Session of the USSR
Supreme Soviet), reprinted in Pravda, Oct. 3, 1989, at 2-4. Ryzhkov introduced inter
alia the Draft Law On the Socialist Enterprise. Id. at 3. The Supreme Soviet voted to
accept the Draft Law for consideration. See Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet No.
561-I, Oct. 2, 1989, Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR 1989, No. 17, item 329.
66. See Clines, Soviet Deputies Fault Gorbachev, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1989, at Al,
col. 5.
67. See Friedman, Baker Says Gorbachev's Economic Plan Lacks Basic Changes, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 1989, at 10, col. 5.
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the market mechanism and unprofitable enterprises must be shut
down.68 Furthermore, the convertibility of the ruble is, in fact, already
being introduced by stages. 69 But Gorbachev has never renounced
recourse to central planning when fundamental problems of the Soviet
economy were involved, exceeding the frame of competence of volun-
tary associations and collectives. 70 Given the prevailing mood among
Soviet consumers, Gorbachev felt that he could not knowingly unleash
uncontrollable forces of inflation and expose the already disgruntled
populace to the spectre of massive unemployment while still calling his
perestroika a quest for a more perfect socialist system. For him, a sudden
plunge into the worst consequences of capitalism without first offering
the people a taste of its benefits could be political suicide. Poland has
taken this plunge, but if Poland succeeds, it will be a victory for capital-
ism, not for socialism. N. P. Shmelev, the head of the Economics
Department of the Soviet Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada, spoke of
68. See, e.g., Gorbachev's address to the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee
on July 29, 1988, reprinted in 12 KOMMUNIST 22-23 (1988). See also Decree of the Ple-
num of the CPSU Central Committee, June 26, 1987, reprinted in Pravda, June 27,
1987, at 3. On the basis of the Decree ofJune 26, 1987, aJoint Decree was published
on July 17, 1987, by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Minis-
ters, No. 820, Ob osnovnykh napravleniakh perestroiki sistemy tsenoobrazovaniia v usloviiakh
novogo khoziaistvennogo mekhanizma [On the Main Directions of the Reorganization of the Sys-
tem of Price Formation Under Conditions of the New Mechanism of the Economy], reprinted in 0
korennoiperestroike upravleniia ekonomikoi [On Radical Restructuring of the Management of the
Economy], in SBORNIK DOKUMENTOV [A COMPENDIUM OF DOCUMENTS] 150-64 (1987).
TheJoint Decree contained guidelines to agencies that were to draft the new pricing
system as an important element of the economic reform. The failure of these
reforms, thus far, to produce tangible results, and the growing dissatisfaction of the
population with this failure (including irritation over the substantial rise in retail
prices charged by the cooperatives) caused postponement of the pricing reforms and
the decrees imposing a ceiling on prices.
For a recent discussion of steps towards establishment of a market mechanism in
retail trade, see Romaniuk, Cherez optovuiu torgovliu - k rynku [Reaching the Market in
Retail Trade], Izvestiia,Jan. 18, 1990. For statistics on business failures in 1988 under
the new system of full cost accounting and self-financing, see Subbotin, Predpriiatie
ob"iavleno neplatezhesposobnym "[An enterprise is declared bankrupt], 11 EKONOMICHESKAIA
GAZETA 15 (1989), (total number in the USSR was 1,752).
69. On Nov. 1, 1989, a highly devalued ruble was introduced in relation to freely
convertible foreign currencies (US $1 = 6 r. 26 k.) in a number of specified cases
(including foreign currency needs of Soviet and resident foreign citizens traveling
abroad). Thereafter, the rate fluctuates monthly. See Izvestiia, Oct. 25, 1989, at 6.
See also Mikheev, Valiuta ukhodit ot 'teni'[Hard Currency Leaves the "Shadows'], Pravda,
Oct. 28, 1989; Berger, Rubl' i dollar: detali vzaimootnoshenii [The Ruble and the Dollar:
Details of Their Mutual Relationship], Izvestiia, Oct. 28, 1989; Gerashchenko, Konvertnost'
rublia: tselesoobraznost, predposylki, perspektivy [Convertibility of the ruble: Expediency, Prereq-
uisites, Prospects], 3 VNESHNIAIA TORGOVLIA 45-48, (1989); Kak sdelat' rubl' konver-
tiruemym [How to make the ruble convertible] (roundtable discussion), 19
PRAVITEL'STVENNYI VESTNIK 8-9 (1989); Gumbel, Soviets Will Devalue Ruble 5075 on
Business Over Next Two Years, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1988, at 1, 6; Passell, Next Step for
Ruble: Devaluation is Likely to Set Stage for Making the Currency Convertible, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 26, 1989, at D2, col. 1.
70. See Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 2.
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"unbearable social tensions" if retail prices rose suddenly. 7 1 And A.
Glushetskii, writing in Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta [The Economic Gazette], justi-
fied the imposition of mandatory price controls upon the cooperatives in
the following terms:
"The most acute social problem relating to the cooperative movement is
connected with prices for goods and services. The right of cooperatives
to determine, as a rule independently, the prices for the goods manufac-
tured by them, led, in the circumstances of the current shortages of con-
sumer goods and services, to a defacto monopoly on [unchecked] price
increases. The population found itself, for all practical purposes,
defenseless in the face of the cooperatives' diktats. Some seventy percent
of consumers find the goods and services of the cooperatives out of their
reach, even though they have a need for many of them." 72
Similarly, V. I. Shum, a senior member of the Commission for Economic
Reform of the USSR Council of Ministers, spoke at length about the
need to introduce measures for the purpose of "preventing the growth
of inflationary processes in the country" and concluded, "we haven't yet
come to grips with the destructive consequences of the looming danger
of inflation."'7 3 To Mr. Baker, of course, spiraling inflation, along with
growing unemployment, was part of the solution to the Soviet economic
dilemma, not a part of the problem itself. Meanwhile, the search for an
answer within the framework of the new Soviet "socialist economic
model" is still on.
Although centralized economic planning seems contrary to a mar-
ket economy, the continued use of Five Year Plans that embody a cen-
trally-planned blueprint for the long-range development of Soviet
economy cannot in itself be interpreted as a retreat from perestroika as
long as the amended text of the 1977 Constitution, enacted on Decem-
ber 1, 1988,74 remains in effect. Article 108(5) of chapter 15 expressly
assigns exclusive jurisdiction over the confirmation or rejection of long-
term state plans for the economic development of the country to the Con-
gress of the People's Deputies of the USSR. Such state plans, in accord-
ance with article 131(2) of chapter 16 of this same amended version of
the Constitution, are formulated and submitted to the Supreme Soviet
by the USSR Council of Ministers. The Congress approved the latest
proposed Five Year Plan by a margin of 1,532 votes to 419.7 5 Formally,
71. Perestroika: The View from Moscow: "We Are Doomed to be Successful," N.Y. Times,
April 30, 1989, § 3, at 2, col. 3.
72. Glushetskii, Kooperativy: Tseny, nalogi [Cooperatives: Prices and Taxes], 15 EIo-
NOMICHESKAIA GAZETA 13-14 (1989).
73. 42 EKONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA 9 (1989).
74. For an English translation of the 1977 Constitution, see THE CONSTTrrIONS
OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLICS: ANALYSIS, TEXTS, REPORTS 71-171 (F. Feld-
brugge ed. 1979). For the 1988 amended text, see Feldbrugge, Comparative Text of the
1977 USSR Constitution with Draft and Final Amendments, 15 REVIEW OF SOCIALIST LAW
No. 1, at 76-115 (1989).
75. See Clines, Gorbachev Wins Vote on Economy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1989, at A18,
col. 6. For the Decree of the Second Congress of the People's Deputies of the USSR
approving N. I. Ryzhkov's Report, see Izvestiia, Dec. 22, 1989, at 1.
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a new amendment of the Constitution alone (or a new Constitution
which is currently being prepared by a commission appointed by Con-
gress) could abolish central economic planning.
None of this, of course, answers the real question: To what extent
can a market economy, if it is indeed the ultimate goal of Gorbachev's
reform, be combined with centralized economic planning? But then,
Gorbachev never did promise his people a capitalist rose garden. 76
5. Pragmatism and Politics: Gorbachev ' Visit to the Pope and "Ideological
Omnivorousness"
The interaction between expediency (or pragmatism) and ideology takes
on an entirely different configuration once we leave the field of economy
and enter the domain of politics. It becomes, in fact, much more com-
plicated. In economic legislation, pragmatism often lies in its motives or
its substance, upon which an ideological imprimatur is formally conferred
by calling the legislation "socialist" or claiming that it contributes to the
strengthening of perestroika. In the case of political pragmatism, one
sometimes finds it in actions and pronouncements of Soviet and Party
leaders which clearly contradict either a law, the Constitution, or - hor-
ribile dictu - the CPSU program, even though such actions or pro-
nouncements may be valuable portents of legislation soon to be
introduced.
For example, President Gorbachev was clearly violating the Soviet
Constitution of 1977 when he told Pope John Paul II during his state
visit to the Vatican:
76. Soviet economic reformers approach the conversion to a market economy
with a set of priorities: (a) the conversion itself is not challenged by "alternatives";
(b) the dismantling of the administrative command economy must not result in the
dismantling of socialism; and (c) the conversion is to be accomplished in stages (and
possibly completed in five to six years), with the reform of the planning process pro-
ceeding in tandem with the introduction of market elements. The restructuring of
the pricing mechanism itself envisages a three-tier system, with each component
evolving toward the free-market model in a different, planned manner. To make the
current rigid planned-economy system amenable to the conversion while preserving
the socialist features of the economy, first priority must be given to reforms affecting
the economic "basis" of the Soviet society (as opposed to "superstructure"), in
Marxist parlance. Legislation effecting the necessary changes is currently being
enacted - including laws on land, ownership, leasing, territorial alternatives, coop-
erative principles, joint stock companies, etc. - and must be assimilated. Reform of
the financial mechanism of the economy is currently planned for 1993-1995 (includ-
ing a two-tier banking system and anti-monopoly laws). For further detail, see
Gorbachev, Vse tsennoe - v praktiku" [Everything of Value - To Be Converted to Practice],
Pravda, Nov. 6, 1989, at 2; Reforma ekonomiki: prognoz na zavtra" [Economic Reform:
Prognosis for Tomorrow] (Stenographic transcript of a session of the Presidium of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR), reprinted in 24 PRAVITEL'STVENNYI VESTNIK 1, 8-9
(1989); Rynok i ozdorovlenie ekonomiki [The Marketplace and Normalization of the Economy]
(Interview with A. V. Orlov), reported in 3 PRAVITEL'STVENNvI VESTNIK 3, (1990);
Radikal'naia Ekonomicheskaia Reforma: Pervoocherednye i dolgovremennye mery: Materialy
dlia obsuzhdeniia [Priorities and Long-term Measures: Discussion Papers], 43 EKONOMICHES-
KAIA GAZETA 4-7 (1989).
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[N]ow we not only proceed from the assumption that no one should inter-
fere in matters of the individual's conscience . . .[w]e also say that the
moral values that religion generated and embodied for centuries can help
in the work of renewal in our country, too .... In fact, this is already
happening.
77
This is hardly compatible with the Constitution of 1977, which in
article 52 only permits the conduct of atheist propaganda, not the
spread of pro-religious sentiments. I don't know how one would classify
the spectacle of bells pealing at St. Basil's Cathedral in Red Square. 78
It is true that Lenin once dismissed religion as a problem of "third-
rate importance" for communism. 7 9 But it is equally true that
Khrushchev, often regarded as the father of the Gorbachev reforms,8 0
issued a decree in 1954 in which he stressed that the Communist Party,
based on the scientific theories of Marx and Lenin, cannot remain neu-
tral and indifferent towards religion but must wage an unrelenting ideo-
logical battle against it.8 1 Khrushchev's decree "on atheistic education"
is more consistent with the letter and spirit of the Soviet Constitution.
As another example of pragmatism in the political realm are certain
statements of the new Soviet Minister of Culture, Nikolai N. Gubenko,
which in my opinion are clearl at odds with the CPSU Party Program in
its most recent revised version of 1986. As introduced by Secretary-
General Gorbachev himself at the Twenty-seventh Party Congress in
1986,82 after one full year of perestroika, it lists "socialist realism" as the
basis of Soviet arts and literature and the Party was exhorted to continue
its war on "ideological indifference" (bezydeinost') and "ideological
omnivorousness" (mirovozzrencheskaia vseiadnost').83 When Minister
Gubenko was asked on November 21, 1989, the day of his confirmation,
about his views on "socialist realism" in the arts, he responded: "I don't
know what this means . . . [E]ach of us artists has his own [concept of]
realism." He claimed that there was no time for theory now and sug-
gested that "[it is the task of the new generation to exclude this kind of
formula."'8 4 Gorbachev himself appears to have partaken of "ideologi-
cal omnivorousness" when he vowed in 1989: "[t]o develop our culture
77. Haberman, Gorbachev Lauds Religion on Eve of Meeting Pope, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1,
1989, at 1, col. 3.
78. See Clines, Bells Are Ringing as Soviets Return Churches to Faithful, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 16, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
79. See McFADDEN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM 128 (1939).
80. See Smirnov, supra note 49, at 23, 103, 143, 248-49, 290.
81. See Levitsky, Khrushchev's Decree on Atheistic Education, 93 AMERICA 428-30
(1955). For Marx's views on religion, see, e.g., MCFADDEN, supra note 79, at 118-31;
S. HooK, FROM HEGEL TO MARX; STUDIES IN THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF
KARL MARX 291-93 (1958). For Lenin's views, see, e.g., L. SCHAPIRO, THE COMMU-
NIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION 346-47 (1960).
82. MATERIALY XXVII S"EZDA KOMMUNISTICHESKOI PARTII SOVETSKOGO SOIUZA
[DOCUMENTS OF THE 27TH CONGRESS OF CPSU] 91-96 (1986).
83. Id. at 169-70. For the full text of the revised Party Program, see id. at 121-87.
84. Kisselgoff, The New Minister of Soviet Culture Takes Truth as Task, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 27, 1989, at C13, col. 1.
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through .. acceptance of all that is applicable in our conditions. '8 5
But in both examples - formal violations of the Constitution and
the CPSU Party Program - we must keep in mind that a new Constitu-
tion was, in fact, already being drafted by a commission set up by the
First Congress of the People's Deputies,86 a new Law on the Freedom of
Conscience was promised by Gorbachev in his visit with Pope John Paul
II, and the draft of a new Party Program (or platform, as it was referred
to), was about to be introduced to the Party's Central Committee by
Secretary-General Gorbachev. It was approved by the Plenum on Febru-
ary 7, 1990.8 7
There are some political and ideological issues, however, on which
Soviet leaders are less likely to adopt a casual attitude or indulge in
"opportunism" in their pronouncements (for example, on questions of
"private ownership" vs. "personal ownership," or on article 6 of the
Constitution which assigns to the Communist Party the monopoly as the
leading and guiding force in Soviet society and the nucleus of its polit-
ical system and of state and social organizations). During the first five
years ofperestroika, the Soviet government remained adamant in its ideo-
logical positions on these questions against all opponents, including
those in Congress and the Supreme Soviet - rigid adherence to the
Party line, principled, and truly Marxist-Leninist.8 8 Or so it seemed.
Yet, when the time came, it was Gorbachev himself who led the opposi-
tion to the retention of the Party's constitutionally-guaranteed status.
The Plenum of the Party's Central Committee on February 7, 1990,
went along with Gorbachev's proposal.8 9 This was no doubt the most
85. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1, col. 6; id. at 2, col. 3.
86. See Gorbachev, supra note 8, at 3.
87. See 0 proekte platformy TsK KPSS k XXVIII S"ezdu partii [On the Draft of the Plat-
form of the CPSU C.C. in View of the XXVIII Party Congress] (Report by M. S. Gorbachev
to the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee), Feb. 5, 1990, reprinted in Pravda,
Feb. 6, 1990, at 1-2. For the text of the Platform, see Izvestiia, Feb. 13, 1990, at 1-2
(the full title is K gumannomu, demokraticheskomu sotsializmu: Platforma TsK KPSS k
XXVIII S "ezdu partii [Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism: Platform of the CPSU C. C.
for the XXVIII Party Congress]). The Platform is to be used as an interim document
pending the drafting and adoption of a new Party Program.
88. The Party's opposition to the recognition of "private" ownership as opposed
to "personal" ownership prevailed in all new laws adopted by Congress and the
Supreme Soviet during autumn 1989 and winter 1989-90. The Party's opposition to
the abolition of article 6 of the Constitution of 1977 was forcefully articulated by
Gorbachev until mid-January 1990. The road traveled by Gorbachev between his
Lithuanian visit and the Plenum of February was eloquently staked by headlines in
the New York Times: Gorbachev Says the Party Should Wait Before Sharing Power (Dec. 10,
1989); Gorbachev Blocks Debate on Ending Party Supremacy (Dec. 13, 1989); Gorbachev
Hints He Would Accept Multiparty Rule (Jan. 14, 1990); Gorbachev Calls on Party to Forgo
Power Monopoly; Meets Hard-Line Opposition (Feb. 6, 1990); Gorbachev Gains Support in
Raucous Debate on Role of Party, Delegates Report (Feb. 7, 1990); Soviet Leaders Agree to
Surrender Communist Party Monopoly on Power (Feb. 8, 1990); While Gorbachev Gives In, the
World Marvels at His Power (Feb. 11, 1990).
89. In the "Platform" adopted on Feb. 7, 1990, section IV provides:
The development of [our] society does not exclude even the possibility of the
creation of [political] parties. The manner of their establishment will be
determined by law and reflected correspondingly by the Constitution of the
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eloquent example of the respective strength of pragmatism and ideology
under Gorbachev's perestroika and I shall return to it again.
B. Perestroika: The Ideological Element
With the events in Eastern Europe of late 1989 still fresh in our memo-
ries, it may be difficult to summon sufficient interest to look at obsolete
or even recent blueprints for the transition to integral communism or
listen to debates about the forms of dictatorship of the proletariat.9 0
How utterly irrelevant such concepts have suddenly becomel Or have
they? The masses did rise and overthrew their oppressors. Only in
China have they failed, and a capitalist government rushed in to toast
the victors. But on which side of the barricades was the "proletariat"?
Which social class was being exploited and which was finally over-
thrown? The old superstructure is being dismantled, but it was erected
under the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the product of a utopia that
had nowhere else to go. The debate which has divided the communist
movement for over seventy years - when and how will the State wither
away-has received an answer in Eastern Europe: the State will remain,
but the Communist Party will wither away. The Party's role as the "van-
guard of the proletariat" has brought the countries of Eastern Europe to
the brink of economic disaster and plunged the Party itself into a moral
bankruptcy. Except in Romania, where an aging dictator had hoped to
cling to his mantle of despotic Stalinism, the Party's failures have forced
it to abdicate its "dialectical" mission virtually without a shot being
fired.
And yet Gorbachev, the man who made the revolutions of Eastern
Europe possible without taking credit for them because, in his own
words, they were "the logical outcome of a certain stage of develop-
ment" which called for change and that change will make them better
USSR .... The CPSU has no claims on a monopoly and is ready to enter into
a political dialogue and to collaborate with all those who speak for a renewal
of socialist society ....
Section VII:
The CPSU will... struggle to maintain its status as the ruling party within the
framework of a democratic process .... [The] party, exercising the right of
legislative initiative, deems it indispensable to introduce an appropriate pro-
posal in the Congress of the People's Deputies ... concerning Article 6 of the
country's Basic Law [i.e., Constitution].
Izuestiia, Feb. 13, 1990, at 1-2, excerpted in English in N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1990, at
A12.
90. On the vicissitudes of the doctrine of the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat,"
see, e.g., I. Lapenna, Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the All-People s State in the Light of
Original AMa dsm, in PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET LAW FOR THE 1980s 33-35 (1982); G.
Ginsburgs, Dictatorship of the Proletariat Versus the All-People's State: Constitutional Con-
trasts, id. at 13-31; A. Fogelklou, Dictatorship of the Proletariat, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOVIET LAW 253-54 (2d ed., F. Feldbrugge, G van den Burg, & W. Simons, eds.
1985); R. SCHLESINGER, MARX: His TIME AND OURS 41, 240, 252, 332-33, 415
(1950); J. PLAMENATZ, GERMAN MARXISM AND RUSSIAN COMMUNISM 155-56, 243-44,
268-69, 299-300, 322-24, 326-28 (1954).
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societies 91 pledged to revive Marxism in the Soviet Union under the
leadership of the Communist Party9 2 by means of perestroika. In fact, he
said, the destinies of perestroika depended on the initiatives of the Party.
1. Lenin ' New Economic Policy and Perestroika
Stephen F. Cohen looks upon Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP)
as the primary source of perestroika's ideological legitimacy.93 Signifi-
cantly, Lenin's retreat from the ruinous economic policies of War Com-
munism by introducing many elements of the market economy is now
assessed by Gorbachev's reformers as a "renewal of socialism." This
could be a most pragmatic ideological safety valve should the current
economic crisis force Gorbachev to take a faster plunge into market
economy than he had intended. But following Lenin's death and the
advent of Stalin's own brand of state socialism and command economy,
NEP entered history as merely a respite from the economic ruin of War
Communism and a temporary retreat from socialist orthodoxy.
Gorbachev, on the other hand, aspires to make his own reforms irrevers-
ible. Cohen also believes that without Khrushchev there would have
been no Gorbachev, 9 4 although his fourteen high-level Soviet per-
estroishchiki whom he interviews together with Katrina van den Heuvel
cite only Khrushchev's role in repudiating Stalinism and his abortive lit-
erary thaw.
Thus, I should like to briefly indicate the extent to which, in my
opinion, Khrushchev's blueprint for the establishment of socialism and
communism has either been retained or repudiated by Gorbachev, to be
replaced by his own "platform" of perestroika. To "Z" of Daedalus fame,
of course, possible differences are nothing if not a desperate exercise in
expediency in the pursuit of identical ideological goals, which Z reduces
to one inevitable model: totalitarian Stalinism. 95 I beg to disagree.
2. Perestroika and Khrushchev's "Integral Communism"
There are more than cosmetic differences between Gorbachev's plat-
form and the "blueprint for the building of communism" drafted by
Khrushchev, that Romantic of communism who was convinced that his
own generation of Soviet people "will live to enjoy the benefits of inte-
91. For Gorbachev's characteristic responses to the events in Eastern Europe in
late 1989 at numerous press conferences, see, e.g., The Bush-Gorbachev News Con-
ference in Malta, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1989, at A12.
92. See Smirnov, supra note 49.
93. Id. at 17.
94. Id. at 290.
95. Z, To the Stalin Mausoleum, 119 DAEDALUS 295-344 (1990). The conclusions
were adapted in The Soviets' Terminal Crisis, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1990, at A23, col. 1,
and uncritically praised on the same page. Safire, The Z Document: "Mr. X" in Our
Time, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1990, at A23, cols. 5-6. The fanfare accorded Z's article in
the N.Y. Times was unprecedented.
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gral communism."96 This has nothing to do with the fact that, as Niko-
lai Shmelev observed, Khrushchev was "only semi-educated and not
sufficiently skilled as a politician."'9 7 That would be like saying that
Gorbachev, instead of exclaiming at the United Nations "we shall bury
you," as Khrushchev had done, would have used Shakespeare's loftier "I
shall live your epitaph to make." 98 The contrast lay in a different
approach to communism, a different interpretation of the historical
stage currently reached by the Soviet Union, and a difference in meth-
ods required to get from here to there. It is irrelevant that to us this
journey might seem, in the words Graham Greene used in a different
context, "a dusty pilgrimage towards a dubious and uninteresting con-
clusion."9 9 The stated goal, after all, may provide us with a yardstick to
measure the progress of Gorbachev's reform just as it allowed us to
appreciate the full extent of the failure of Khrushchev's.
3. Stalin's "Socialism in One Country"
The common point of departure in evaluating and comparing
Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's ideological positions lies in what Marx
had failed to predict and what Stalin was forced to do, in part by expedi-
ency, as a consequence of this failure. Stalin successfully advanced his
theory of "Socialism in One Country," (despite "Capitalist Encircle-
ment"), as opposed to Trotsky's "world revolution first,"'10 0 after it had
become clear that the 1917 revolution would remain confined to Russia
alone. And, having built socialism in Russia, which was State socialism
but socialism nevertheless, Stalin half announced and half implied that
he would go on building communism alone, without awaiting final vic-
tory of socialism globally (Marx notwithstanding), and without awaiting
the liquidation of capitalist encirclement.101
96. See Programma KPSS [Program of the CPSU] (adopted by the XXII CPSU Con-
gress on Oct. 31, 1961), reprinted in 3 XXII S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo
Soiuza. Stenograficheskii Otchet [XXIIth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Stenographic Transcript] 276 (1962); N. Khrushchev, 0 programme KPSS, id., vol. 2, at
167.
97. SHMELYOv, The Rebirth of Common Sense, in VOICES OF GLASNOST: INTERVIEWS
WITH GORBACHEV'S REFORMERS 143 (S. Cohen & K. van den Heuvel eds. 1989). The
late British writer and political commentator, Edward Crankshaw, would have dis-
agreed with Shmelyov. In Khrushchev's Russia, he wrote: "[B]oth Malenkov and
Khrushchev are first-class politicians, the latter rather more first-class than the for-
mer." E. CRANKSHAW, KHRUSHCHEV'S RUSSIA 61 (1959).
98. SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS AND A LOVER'S COMPLAINT 85 (S. Wells ed. 1985)
(Sonnet 81).
99. GREENE, HenryJames: The Private Universe in COLLECTED ESSAYS 21 (Penguin
Ed. 1981) (reprint of a 1936 essay).
100. See E. CARR, 2 SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY 1924-26, pt. I, 36-51 (1959) (vol. 6
of Carr's A History of Soviet Russia).
101. See Medalie, The Communist Theory of State, 18 AM. SLAVIC & E. EUR. REV. 510,
520-21 (1959).
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4. Khrushchev's Integral Communism
Nikita S. Khrushchev's pronouncements on future communist society
constitute a far greater contribution to the "creative development of
Marxism-Leninism" on this subject than for which Stalin could ever take
credit. Although Khrushchev's views do owe a great debt to both Lenin
and Stalin, the differences are more significant than the similarities.
Such differences were the product of Khrushchev's own analysis,
inspired by his re-assessment of the balance of power in the post-war
world, and resulting from the formation of a ring of satellite buffer
states along Soviet borders, the emergence of new political structures on
the ashes of the former colonial empires, China's claim to have found a
"shortcut" to communism, and the modified political, military, and eco-
nomic situation in the Soviet Union itself.10 2
Mikhail S. Gorbachev did not, at first, expressly quarrel with
Khrushchev's basic assessment; he merely revised and even reversed
Khrushchev's conclusions in line with a new political reality which he
preferred to call a new stage, reached by the Soviet Union and the world
in the second half of the 1980s. And indeed, both the Soviet Union and
the world had changed a great deal in the late 1980s.
Khrushchev believed that the new post-war geopolitical realities
allowed the Soviet Union to repudiate some of Stalin's "fundamental
laws" concerning the building of communism in Soviet society, such as
the concepts of "Socialism in One Country"'10 3 and "Capitalist Encircle-
ment."1 0 4 Communism, Khrushchev believed, could again be built on
an international scale, just as Marx had said it would be, and "integral
communism" was within sight. It was on the State's role during the
period of transition to integral communism, and under communism
itself, that Khrushchev voiced some of his most original ideas, not hesi-
tating to deviate even from Lenin's views on this subject (e.g., on the role
of violence). 10 5 While believing that the "withering away of the State"
102. Many of Khrushchev's conclusions were articulated by him at the 21st Party
Congress held 31 years ago (Jan. 27-Feb. 5, 1959). For the transcript of
Khrushchev's Report, see Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 9, col. 4.
103. On the theory and building of "Socialism in One Country," see, e.g., CARR,
supra note 100, at 36-51 (Carr devoted four volumes of his History of Soviet Russia to
"Socialism in One Country." The four volumes were published between 1958 and
1964). See generally HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BoL-
SHEVIKS): SHORT COURSE 415-28 (1951) (an official English version, published under
Stalin).
104. J. STALIN, PROBLEMS OF LENINISM 189-90 (1953). For Khrushchev's repudia-
tion of this doctrine, see Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 9, col. 4.
105. Classical Marxist-Leninist doctrine considered violence indispensable to
achieving the three goals of the proletarian revolution: to seize power; to crush the
resistance of the defeated bourgeoisie; and to guide the masses in the work of
organizing a socialist society. See K. MARx, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 82 (Gateway
English ed. 1954); V. LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION 15-16 (English ed. 1932). Stalin
justified his rule of terror by his thesis, according to which class struggle becomes
more acute with the advance towards a higher phase of socialism. Cf L. Labedz,
Ideology: The Fourth Stage, 8 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM No. 6, 1959, at 3-5.
Khrushchev modified the thesis on the absolute need for violence as the main pro-
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can begin even during the "preliminary stage of communism," i.e.,
"socialism,"' 10 6 by gradually turning over some of the functions of the
State to "social" organizations,' 0 7 Khrushchev denied that there was a
"shortcut" to communism (such as was implied by the Chinese "Big
Leap Forward")' 0 8 and drew up a blueprint for a "unified approach"
towards transition to communism, in which all socialist countries would
reach "integral communism" simultaneously. 10 9
As for the final "withering away" of the State, Khrushchev
subordinated it to the fulfillment of a number of political, economic, and
social prerequisites. t 1 He saw it as a process of "gradual evolution
towards communist self-government."'' But while the formal State
apparatus in the other socialist countries would gradually wither away,
and the State borders would themselves become pointless,'12 the State
would linger on in the Soviet Union, although its function would be
chiefly that of coordinating economic integration within the Communist
Commonwealth. "13
Gorbachev never discussed the dynamics of integral communism
nor the process of the withering away of the State under communism,
and for good reason, as we shall see.
moter of the proletarian revolution. Cf S. Possony, Nonviolent Violence: Khrushchev's
Program for Conquest, in THE GREAT PRETENSE, H.R. REP. No. 2189, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 5-14 (1956). Khrushchev stressed the role of persuasion instead. Cf P.
ROMASHKIN, in 2 Soy. Gos. & PRAvo 17-30 (1960).
106. To which as time progressed, was added the stage of "mature socialism."
KONST. SSSR, Preamble (1977). See also Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 8.
107. In the field ofjustice; maintenance of public order; growing participation of
the masses in the political life of the country, etc. Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 9;
ROMASHKIN, supra note 105, at 25-27. For excerpts from the Statutes on the People's
Guards and on Comrade's Courts, see J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, THE
SovIET LEGAL SYSTEM 19-30 (3d ed. 1977);J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, THE
SOvIET LEGAL SYSTEM: THE LAw IN THE 1980s 18-21 (1984). See also A. LEPESHRIN,
XXI S"EZD KPSS 0 GOSUDARSTVE [THE XXI CONGRESS OF THE CPSU ON THE STATE]
26-29 (1959); V. GSOVSKI, Legislation of the Soviet Republics and Laws on Anti-Soviet Para-
sitic Elements, in 5 HIGHLIGHTS OF CURRENT LEGISLATION AND ACTIVITIES IN MID-
EUROPE 405-09 (1957); V. GsOVSKI, An Analysis of the Soviet Union's Revised Criminal
Code, NEW LEADER, Apr. 27, 1959, at 11; Decree of the CPSU Central Committee, On
the Tasks of Party Propaganda in Present-Day Conditions, Jan. 9, 1960, reprinted in I KOM-
MUNIST 10-24 (1960).
108. Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 8-9. See also Levitsky, Post-Mortem of a Party Congress,
AMERICA, May 2, 1959, at 274-75.
109. See Levitsky, supra note 108, at 273; Levitsky, Soviet-Satellite Relations, AMERICA,
Mar. 12, 1960, at 709; Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 9, col. 4.
110. These included, inter alia, (a) various measures for "further democratization"
of the Soviet system (political and cultural democracy, social "self-government,"
popular justice, creation of a "territorial army"); (b) expansion of socialist produc-
tion, raising the living standards of the population, raising collective farm property to
the level of public property; (c) gradual elimination of antitheses between industry
and agriculture, and between physical and mental labor.
S111. See Khrushchev, supra note 4.
112. Id.
113. See LEPESHEIN, supra note 107, at 7-12; Davletke'diev, Razvitie XXI S"ezdom
KPSS ucheniia o sotsialisticheskom gosudarstve [The Teaching About the Socialist State as Devel-
oped by the XXI Congress of CPSU, 11 KOMMUNIST 17 (1959).
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5. Gorbachev's Rejection of Confrontation and Endorsement of Different Paths
to Socialism
Gorbachev implicitly agreed with Khrushchev on the need for discarding
Stalin's doctrine of "Capitalist Encirclement," but replaced
Khrushchev's justifications. Instead of stressing Soviet industrial and
military might as making the likelihood of foreign aggression against the
Soviet Union unlikely while permitting the two ideologically hostile
camps of class enemies to co-exist and even compete in an armed peace,
(with the knowledge that in time the inner contradictions within the cap-
italist bloc will cause its disintegration in line with Marxist teaching),1 14
Gorbachev played down class antagonism and ideological differences in
favor of common human values, fears, and aspirations. This made coop-
eration and the common cause the only alternative to confrontation and
total annihilation of our common civilization, the preservation of which
we are jointly responsible.1 15 He did not, however, give up the theory
of inner contradictions of capitalism. Gorbachev was not about to boast
of Soviet economic might and pleaded for a concerted reduction of the
military threat to permit concentration on the economic ravages caused
by both Stalin's brand of "Socialism in One Country" and the misman-
agement of the country's economy by administrative fiats and sheer stag-
nation under Stalin's successors.
Unlike Khrushchev, Gorbachev does not invoke the formation of a
belt of satellite buffer states along the Soviet borders as an argument for
the discarding of the doctrine of "Capitalist Encirclement." The prag-
matic lessons of recent history have taught Gorbachev that Stalin's doc-
trine of "Socialism in One Country," which Khrushchev had discarded,
should not be replaced with "Simultaneous Transition to Communism,"
but with "Multiplicity of Models in Building Socialism." The time for
Integral Communism is not close at hand." 1 6 Gorbachev is not a roman-
tic d la Khrushchev.
6. The Ideological Justifications for Reform
Both Khrushchev and Gorbachev were very slow in addressing theoreti-
cal questions of the transition of Soviet society from the preliminary
stage of "socialism," or even "mature socialism," 1 17 to communism, the
114. See, e.g., A. MEYER, LENINISM 238-39, 248-56 (1957); SCHLESINGER, supra note
90, at 178-201; S. LEVlTSKY, INTRODUCTION TO KARL MARX, DAs KAPITAL xiii-xiv
(Gateway ed. 6th printing 1970).
115. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1-3.
116. Id. at 1 ("[r]emoved far in the future").
117. Neither Marx nor Lenin foresaw an "intermediate" stage in the transition
from capitalism to socialism (id. at 2) and the characterizations of Soviet society such
as "socialism" (KoNsT. SSSR (1936)); "all-people's state" (Khrushchev; adopted in
Constitution of 1977); or "developed socialism" (KoNsT. SSSR (1977)) are artificial
(and, according to Gorbachev, exaggerated) constructions corresponding to the
Communist Party's compulsion to record progress on the road to integral commu-
nism and to convince the citizens that there has, in fact, been progress towards a
classless society and "integral communism." Gorbachev characterized his perestroika
as "an historically intermediate stage of development," supra note 49, at 3, presuma-
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final stage of societal evolution charted by Marx.'1 8 In Khrushchev's
case, the efforts to address these questions came three years after he
stunned the world with his Secret Speech at the 20th Party Congress; in
Gorbachev's case, he waited until he approached the end ofperestroika's
fourth year. In both cases, the impetus came from a challenge that had
placed them on the defensive, forcing them to refute their opponents by
recourse to ideological arguments. Khrushchev's response to his oppo-
nents was a full-blown ideological blueprint; Gorbachev delivered an
auto-da-fl, characteristically justifying pragmatic but revisionist ideas,
dressing them up in the mantle of Marxism-Leninism.
It is perhaps ironic that the theoretical underpinnings of
Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's actions were preceded, in both cases, by
rebuffs addressed to "hotheads" impatient to get on with reform and
calling for faster pace. In Khrushchev's case, the rebels wanted to reach
"integral communism" more quickly,119 while in Gorbachev's case,
"hotheads" (Yeltsin and company) demanded a quicker pace for
reforms which would have led perestroika away from communism.120
What were the challenges that forced the two Soviet leaders to turn to
ideological crutches? How did they react?
a. Khrushchev's "Integral Communism"
In Khrushchev's case, the emerging status of China as an ideological
leader in its own right, particularly the implications of the "Big Leap
Forward" experiment and the implied Chinese boast that China would
attain integral communism within a decade, made it imperative for the
Soviet Union to redefine its own stand on the question of transition to
communism.1 21 The challenge to the historically-rooted Soviet ideolog-
bly between "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "developed socialism," with inte-
gral communism being a distant "ideal" society with a still uncharted (and
unchartable) road of access.
118. Neither Marx nor Lenin attempted to chart the road to integral communism.
See Gorbachev, supra note 49. For a "Marxist" discussion of final communist society,
see SCHLESINGER, supra note 90, at 385-401.
119. At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev criticized the "hotheads"
who were calling for "an immediate realization of the principles of communist soci-
ety" and were drawing up "a detailed timetable for the transition to communism."
Medalie, supra note 101, at 523 (quoting Khrushchev). See also Achimov, Theoretical
Problems of Communism and the Twenty-First Party Congress, 6 BULLETIN: INST. FOR THE
STUDY OF THE USSR, Mar. 1959, at 7.
120. After casting his ballot in the first elections to the Congress of the People's
Deputies on March 26, 1989, Gorbachev cautioned against impatience with the pace
of reforms and remarked: "We must not commit stupidities, attempt great leaps for-
ward, or overreach ourselves because we could put the people's future at risk." N.Y.
Times, Mar. 27, 1989, at Al, col. 5. Gorbachev had on various previous occasions
criticized "hotheads" who failed to understand the need for prudence in carrying out
reforms.
121. See Chairman Mao Speaks on Current Situation, Peking Rev., Sept. 16, 1958,
at 4. On the "Big Leap Forward" doctrine, see S. Rich, D. Rousset & R. L6wenthal,
China's Uninterrupted Revolution, 8 PROB. COMMUNISM, Jan.-Feb. 1959, at 1-24. China
launched "The Big Leap Forward" on September 10, 1958, in a resolution of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, On the Creation of the People's
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ical leadership was very real indeed.
Khrushchev responded, at the 21st Party Congress, by formulating
his theses about the "simultaneous transition to communism" of all the
socialist regimes.122 The theses were designed:
- to reject the Chinese concept of a "shortcut to communism" as
ideologically wrong; an aberration and impertinent;
- to preserve the political unity of the socialist camp and ensure a
uniform approach toward the issue of transition to integral
communism;
- to ensure that this transition would take place under Soviet
direction.
Rebuking the Chinese, Khrushchev pointed out that "the transition
from the socialist stage of development to the higher stage is a regular
historical process which cannot be violated or by-passed at will." 123
You may recall the Orson Welles commercial: "We shall sell no wine
before its time." This is a close enough parallel. Still, the shock of a
possible Chinese shortcut may have sufficiently terrified Khrushchev
into suggesting that under Soviet direction the process could be com-
pleted within his own generation. 124 This was clearly a counter-boast
and not easily compatible with Khrushchev's own implied assumption
that no transition to communism could take place until Albania and
Mongolia caught up economically with the Soviet Union or East
Germany.
b. Gorbachev's Perestroika
In Gorbachev's case, the challenge to come up with convincing ideological
arguments to defeat a political threat from within the ranks of his own
party and of the Congress of People's Deputies, which he had created,
originated amidst the fervor of the revolutionary upheaval in Eastern
Europe which Gorbachev himself had endorsed if not directly
encouraged. 12 5 This threat was the call for political pluralism and the
Communes in the Villages. The Resolution proclaimed: "It seems that the realization of
communism in our country is already not something far away. We must actively use
the form of the people's commune and through it find the concrete road of transition
to Communism." Jen Minjih Pao, Sept. 10, 1958. See also Z. BRZEZINSKI, THE SOVIET
BLOC: UNITY AND CONFLICT 366-68 (1960).
122. Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 9, col. 4.
123. Id at col. 3.
124. See supra note 96.
125. "Mr. Gorbachev's achievement was having the vision to see the inevitable,
and adopting it as his program rather than applying the repressive apparatus at his
command to suppress it." Keller, While Gorbachev Gives In, the World Marvels at His
Power, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1990, § 4, at 1, 2, col. 2. While this may have been true
in regard to the events in Eastern Europe in late 1989, the N.Y. Times reporter fails
to do justice to Gorbachev's power of initiative in carrying out reforms that are
changing the USSR itself and its people more effectively than 70-year old slogans
about the "New Man" supposedly being formed under communism. Mr. Keller's
colleague, R. W. Apple, Jr., was closer to the truth here when he wrote, "as Dr.
Sakharov himself wrote not too long before his death, it was Mr. Gorbachev, for all
his failings, who made the decisions 'that completely changed the situation in the
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termination of the Communist Party's constitutionally guaranteed posi-
tion as the leading and guiding force in each country. In the Soviet
Union, this principle was embodied in article 6 of the 1977
Constitution. 1
2 6
Coincidentally, Gorbachev may have felt the need to defend his
reforms, and the revolutions in Eastern Europe which they had
spawned, against Chinese accusations that Gorbachev had betrayed
orthodox Marxism-Leninism which the Chinese "upheld" following the
pro-democracy revolts at Tiananmen Square. An informal Chinese
Party memorandum accused President Gorbachev of "subverting social-
ism" and having catalyzed similar subversion in Eastern Europe.12 7
But Gorbachev seemed primarily concerned with justifying the
retention of article 6, for the present at least, as the principal instrument
ofperestroika. The reasons he cited in November 1989 had a ring of logic
and sincerity about them, coming as they did from the principal architect
of the current reforms who, like a modern Archimedes, pleads in anger
and frustration: "Do not destroy my perestroika!'"
The declaration of independence by the Lithuanian Communist
Party from Moscow, 12 8 followed by Latvia's repeal of article 6, added an
element of urgency to Gorbachev's call for the preservation of article 6.
The Communist Party's leading role, its monopoly in fact, was neces-
sary, said -Gorbachev, because:
- while each country in Eastern Europe has the right, free from
outside pressure, to shape its political and social future as it deems
Soviet Union and the psychology of its people.'" N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1989, § 4, at
1, col. 2. As for Mr. Gorbachev himself, he only claimed that,
deep changes in socialist countries . . . proceed in the same mainstream as
our perestroika, although we in no way encouraged these processes ....
New political forces [in Eastern Europe] include both those who support the
socialist idea and those who seek other ways of social development ....
[A]ny nation has the right to decide its fate itself, including the choice of a
system .... [In our country] we are carrying out perestroika on the basis of
our own socialist principles.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1989, at A18, col. 5 (TASS English translation of speech to
CPSU Central Committee, Dec. 11, 1989).
126. Article 6 defines the status of the Communist Party in the USSR as "[t]he
leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system
[and] of all state organizations and public organizations," functioning within the
framework of the Constitution of the USSR. KONST. SSSR, art. 6 (1977).
127. See Worried Chinese Leadership Says Gorbachev Subverts Communism, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 28, 1989, at Al, col. 4. See also Kristof, In Reaction to Rumania, A Hardening in
Beijing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1990, at 16, col 5 ("Mr. Ceausescu was one of the few
world leaders to praise China's military crackdown of the democracy movement").
128. President Gorbachev declared, in a speech to the Central Committee of the
CPSU on December 26, that he considered the decision of the Lithuanian Party "ille-
gitimate," since the Deputies to the Lithuanian 20th Communist Party Congress
"were given a mandate for perestroika, not a split of the party .... " N.Y. Times,
Dec. 27, 1989, at A12, col. 2. On the decision to break away from Moscow, see id.,
Dec. 21, 1989, at Al, col. 1. On the decision to abolish constitutionally guaranteed
monopoly on power of the Lithuanian Communist Party and legalize a multiparty
system, see id., Dec. 7, 1989, at A21; Dec. 8, 1989, at Al. See also Fein, Gorbachev Voices
Alarm on Lithuanian Party Split, id., Dec. 22, at A12.
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best, the Communist Party in the USSR has gained its legitimacy by
leading the socialist revolution to victory, more than seventy years
ago. The revolution now continues in the form of perestroika
designed to reshape the entire edifice of society, from basis to
superstructure, until socialism re-emerges with a new, modem,
more human and true face. The fate of perestroika is linked to the
Party's fate. The Party's initiative had launched perestroika and now
provides its direction. 129
- Many promises have been made to the people by Lenin's succes-
sors in the name of building socialism. Too many have remained
unfulfilled. The people are tired of promises and the Party leaders'
failure to create living standards for the population worthy of a civi-
lized state. The present Party leadership must be given a chance to
make good on missed opportunities, false promises, and frustrated
hopes, to discharge its responsibility for correcting past errors and
distortions in the building of socialism. Perestroika must be allowed
to continue.1 30
- Freed from the burden of daily meddling into minute details of
running the affairs of the country, the Party can now devote its
efforts to pondering the meaning of current trends and political
realities and formulating political platforms and long-range goals
for the transformation of society, always guided by the principles of
glasnost, pluralism, competition of ideas, rights of individuals, and
socialism adjusted to the requirements of today and tomorrow,
socialism that is non-confrontational, focussed on the individual,
and mindful of.the common fears and aspirations of our civilization
regardless of political and social formations. Concrete proposals
and recommendations for implementation of these policies shall be
submitted for the consideration of the people in the persons of its
elected representatives.13 1
- In building socialism in its reshaped but genuinely Marxist form,
the Party of Lenin, engaged in the formulation ofperestroika, contin-
ues indeed to be the vanguard of Soviet society. It must retain its
present independence 13 2 although acting within the commands of the
Constitution and of other Soviet laws. In its function as agent of
renewal of socialist society, the Party cannot abdicate its role and
right of initiative to populist demagogues, nationalist or chauvinist
currents, or the separate agendas of pressure groups.' 33
- Debate about the role of the Party is in order, but it must take
place in its proper forum, namely the Commission for Constitu-
129. Based on Gorbachev's article in Pravda, supra note 49, at 1-3, and his subse-
quent speeches, reports, and interviews as reported in Pravda and Izvestiia, Dec. 1,
1989 - Feb. 8, 1990. See also N.Y. Times reports and dispatches covering the same
time period.
130. Gorbachev, supra note 49.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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tional Reform of the Congress of the People's Deputies and aired as
well at the Twenty-eighth CPSU Party Congress which was resched-
uled to meet in Autumn 1990, earlier than the date originally fixed,
and subsequently, advanced again to the early summer of 1990.134
Concrete proposals would then be submitted to the Congress of the
People's Deputies which has final authority on amending the Con-
stitution or drafting a new one.' 35
Two months and five days after his passionate plea for retention of
the Party's constitutionally guaranteed role in Soviet society as the
prime mover behind the reforms ofperestroika and architect of the "new
socialism," Gorbachev stood before the Plenum of the Party's Central
Committee and urged it to accept the removal of the constitutional
guarantee for the Party's special status. The Plenum complied on Feb-
ruary 7, 1990.136
7. Gorbachev's Ambivalence Towards Article 6 and the Movement
to Abolish It
Non-confrontational socialist ideology replacing the struggle of classes;
defense of universal human values in lieu of those of the proletariat
alone; the individual in the center of the collective's preoccupations:
these were the principles of Gorbachev's own vision of socialism embod-
ied in his perestroika. Yet, in his appeal for the retention of article 6,
Gorbachev felt obligated to present it as a road to the future which was
designed by Marx and Lenin (even though the mantle of ideology could
not entirely conceal the return to many old-fashioned non-Marxist posi-
tions, once decried as bourgeois), in a pragmatic effort to preserve,
understated in the appeal, as much of socialism as seven decades of
avowed economic mismanagement would permit. Gorbachev would
even make an appeal, if necessary, to a kind of revised version of
"Socialism in One Country," with perestroika continuing where Lenin left
off, but without "Capitalist Encirclement."
134. Gorbachev, Oproekteplatformy TsK KPSS k XXVIII S"ezdu Partii"[On the Draft of
the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the XXVIII Congress of the Party], Pravda,
Feb. 6, 1990, at 1-2.
135. In actual fact, the Congress met in an extraordinary session in March 1990,
on the initiative of Mr. Gorbachev himself, to create the post of President and vote on
its powers; it was during this March meeting that the constitutional monopoly of the
Party under article 6 was abolished by a vote of 1,771 to 264, with 74 abstentions. In
press reports, Western and Soviet alike, the vote, and the entire question of formal
repeal of article 6, were submerged in accounts of the progress of debates on the new
presidency. The quiet demise of article 6 was possibly intentional. See Parliament
Votes Expanded Powers for Soviet Leader, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
136. See Gorbachev, supra note 134, at 1-2. See also, Excerpts from Remarks by
Gorbachev Before Central Committee of Party, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1990, at A16, col. 1;
Keller, Gorbachev Calls on Party to Forgo Power Monopoly; Meets Hard-Line Opposition, id. at
Al, col. 3. For affirmative vote by the Central Committee's Plenum, see Clines, Soviet
Leaders Agree to Surrender Communist Party Monopoly on Power, id., Feb. 8, 1990, at Al, col.
6. For the text of the new Platform, see Izvestiia, Feb. 13, 1990, at 1-2.
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Not uncharacteristically, when Gorbachev's all-out effort in January
1990 to persuade the Lithuanian parliament not to legalize rival political
parties failed, 137 his immediate reaction was pragmatic: "I do not see
anything tragic about a multiparty system if it emerges and meets the
realistic interests of society," he told the Lithuanians. 138 This, and his
subsequent offer to give up Party monopoly in the USSR, may have been
an act of political wisdom as well as of expediency. But I refuse to
believe that Gorbachev, who considered the Communist Party as the
principal instrument of social engineering, the Gorbachev who liked to
do things "the Bolshevik way" 139 and was now engaged in transforming
Soviet society in the image fashioned by him - a humane and "mod-
em" Marxism-Leninism-could have been satisfied with a shrug of his
shoulders, destined to be echoed by that of history in the cruel imitation
of the shrug closing the last chapter concerning Arthur Koestler's Dark-
ness at Noon. 140 And could Gennadi Gerasimov, speaking of "the
Gorbachev doctrine" still say and mean it: "He'll do it his way"? Make
no mistake about it: for Gorbachev, the Lithuanian Parliament's deci-
sion was a tragedy.
On the question of the supremacy of the Party in the life of Soviet
society, Gorbachev was surely in agreement with Khrushchev who said
at the 21st Party Congress: "one of the key principles of Leninism [is]
... that in the process of building communist society, the role of the Party
must increase, not decrease .... ,141 But how can it increase if it has
already diminished in the process of building socialist society, the prelim-
inary and inferior phase of communism? Gorbachev's pragmatism won
over ideology.
8. Khrushchev's Simultaneous Transition to Communism Through Planned
Economic Integration
The ideological differences between Khrushchev and Gorbachev
beeome still more pronounced when we examine more closely the con-
sequences for the Soviet buffer states, in Eastern Europe, of
Khrushchev's 1959 theses of the "simultaneous transition to commu-
137. See Fein, Gorbachev Urges Lithuania to Stay With Soviet Union, N.Y. Times, Jan.
12, 1990, at Al, col. 6. Gorbachev pleaded with the Lithuanians: "separation would
spell the end of his economic and political changes in the Soviet Union, and strongly
suggested it could threaten his position ... 'We have embarked on this path, and I
am the one who chose it,' he said, 'My personal fate is linked to this choice.'" Id
138. Excerpts from Gorbachev's speech are reproduced in the N.Y. Times,Jan. 15,
1990, at A9, col. 1.
139. See, e.g., Report of Gorbachev, Secretary-General of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee, to the XIX All-Union CPSU Conference, 0 khode realizatsii reshenii XXVII S"ezda
KPSS i zadachakh po uglubleniiu perestroiki [On the Progress in Implementing the Decision of the
XXVII CPSU Congress and On Tasks Relating to the Intensification of Perestroika], June 28,
1988, reprinted in 10 KOMMUNIST 50 (1988).
140. A. KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON 266-67 (1941).
141. See Shitarev, Povyshenie rukovodiashchei roli Partii v stroitel'stve kommunizma
[Strengthening of the Role of the Party in the Building of Communism], 12 KOMMUNIST 13
(1958). See also Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959; Labedz, supra note 105, at 8.
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nism" of all the socialist regimes, albeit under Soviet direction, which
Khrushchev had enunciated at the 21st Party Congress and in several
other speeches. 14 2 Even Gorbachev had at first accepted many of the
practical implications of this doctrine.
Khrushchev's theses meant that the system of "little Russias" and
"little Stalins" in Eastern Europe was over, to be replaced by the
increasing importance of multilateral action involving several or all sat-
ellite countries, with a view towards an eventual "socialist economic
commonwealth,"143 operating on the principles of international division
of labor and economic specialization.14 4 In a word: integration - ever-
expanding and planned economic integration 14 5 - which was to be the
basis for the eventual "simultaneous transition to communism." In
Khrushchev's own words:
Can we envisage a situation in which one of the socialist countries passes
to communism and introduces communist principles of production and
distribution, while other countries are left trailing behind, somewhere in
the early stages of socialist construction? That prospect is highly improb-
able... [T]he socialist countries will more or less simultaneously pass to
the higher stage, that of communist society.' 4 6
We know today that neither Khrushchev nor his successors ever
succeeded in thoroughly integrating the East European economies.
Still, it is important to recall the means by which the Soviet leadership
had proposed to achieve this goal: "synchronization" of the satellite
economic plans with that of the USSR; 14 7 establishment of overall eco-
nomic targets;' 48 planned cooperation in the exchange of invest-
ments; 14 9 and ambitious joint economic projects, from an inter-linking
oil and gas pipeline network to a common television hookup,' 50 to full
convertibility of national currencies within the bloc.
Sooner or later, according to Khrushchev, economic integration
would result in a political union of the communist-rule world. 15 1 While
at the time the Soviet leaders were reluctant to offend the national sus-
142. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
143. See Deutscher, The Soviet Economic Commonwealth, THE REPORTER, July 9, 1959,
at 9-13; and BRZEZINSKI, supra note 121, at 400.
144. See Pravda, Dec. 17, 1959.
145. E. EUR., Apr. 1960, at 9. See also Swiss REV. WORLD AFF., June 1959, at 4.
146. Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 9, col. 4.
147. See Le Monde, May 19, 1959; Christian Science Monitor, May 29, 1959, at 1,
col. 3; N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1959, at 3, col. 1; Pravda, Dec. 17, 1959.
148. See N.Y. Times, May 24, 1959, at 1, col. 3; id., May 25, 1959, at 1, col.4.
149. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1958, at 15, col. 1.
150. See London Times, June 8, 1959, at 14, col. 4; id., Sept. 28, 1959, at 9, col. 4;
id., Jan. 20, 1960, at 4, col. 1; Levitsky, Soviet-Satellite Relations, AMERICA, Mar. 12,
1960, at 709-11; Levitsky, Communists'Economic Alliance, COLUMBIA, June 1961, at 12-
13, 33.
151. See BRZEZINSKI, supra note 121, at 401; Zauberman, Economic Integration:
Problems and Prospects, PROB. OF COMMUNISM, July-Aug. 1959, at 23, 29.
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ceptibilities of the satellite countries 152 and press for an outright surren-
der of their national sovereignties, Khrushchev left no doubt as to the
extent to which he was relying on economic integration to achieve a
political union of the communist camp. In a speech in Leipzig on March
7, 1959, reported in Pravda, Khrushchev said:
Communist society.., is capable of satisfying the needs of every individ-
ual as well as every nation .... In these conditions .... state borders will
disappear, as Marxism-Leninism has taught. In all likelihood, only ethnic
borders will survive for a time .... They will simply demarcate the histor-
ically formed location of a given region .... [Ilt seems to me that the
further development of the socialist countries will in all probability pro-
ceed along the lines of consolidation of the single-world socialist eco-
nomic system. One by one, the economic barriers which divided our
countries under capitalism will fall.., eventually making the question of
borders a pointless one.1 53
Khrushchev was right in one respect. Within a generation's life-
span, the borders have begun to fall. Only the dream of communist
society is more distant today than it may have appeared in Stalin's or
Khrushchev's time. And it would be presumptuous and wrong to sug-
gest that there may be a continuity between Khrushchev's thoughts on
the obliteration of borders in Eastern Europe and Gorbachev's more
recent advocacy of a "common European home."
9. The Evolution of Comecon Under Perestroika
In Khrushchev's scheme for a "simultaneous transition to communism,"
the Soviet Union was to retain the role of leadership. Ideologically,
Khrushchev justified this role by the Soviet Union's position as the most
economically advanced of the socialist countries, not only in economic
and military terms, but also in terms of advancement towards commu-
nism. It had the right, nay, the duty, to share its rich experience in
building socialism and communism with the others154 and to ensure and
protect, by its military might, the final victory of socialism in the satellite
countries. Khrushchev, the "designated father" ofperestroika, had clearly
formulated the doctrine which is known in the West as the Brezhnev
doctrine. 155 Just as he has articulated the doctrine according to which,
in the period of the gradual transition from socialism to communism,
the Soviet state will not entirely wither away but will acquire a new func-
tion that will become increasingly important as the other functions of
the state were gradually being vacated: the function of organizing,
strengthening, and expanding mutual cooperation, economic, political,
and cultural, between countries belonging to the world system of
152. See Deutscher, Communism's Common Market, NEW STA'TESMAN, July 11, 1959, at
37; and Zauberman, supra note 151, at 29.
153. Pravda, Mar. 27, 1959. See Davletkel'diev, supra note 113, at 17.
154. See Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 9. LEPESHKIN, supra note 107, at 5, 7, 8-12;
Romashkin, Sovetskoe gosudarsivo v period razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunizma [Soviet State
in the Period of Intensified Building of Communism], 2 VMU 139-54 (1959).
155. See HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTrER & SMIT, supra note 3.
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socialism.156
Decidedly, there was more to Khrushchev's concepts of socialism
and communism than his de-Stalinization and his abortive literary thaw.
In the first years of perestroika, indeed in some ways even up to the
victory of the recent revolutions in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev has
actively pursued Khrushchev's goal of greater integration of the satellite
economies, alas, with just as little success. I shall cite here but two
examples among many of this continuity, one from legislation enacted in
1987, the other from drafts of legislation that had not yet been enacted
by 1989.
When the Soviet government published its first joint venture laws in
1987, the proposed joint ventures pursued a different goal depending
on whether they were formed with firms from capitalist or developing
countries 15 7 on the one hand, or with enterprises, associations and orga-
nizations from CMEA (Comecon) countries on the other. 158 The termi-
nology of the decrees themselves, as well as the authoritative
commentaries, were explicit enough: Joint ventures with firms from
capitalist countries had as their goal the promotion of "cooperation on
the basis of mutual advantage," while joint ventures with Comecon eco-
nomic entities pursued the goal of "deepening socialist economic inte-
gration and binding more closely the scientific-technological and
production potential of the countries of the socialist community." Arti-
cle 25 of the Decree on joint Comecon ventures stipulated that "the assets
of the joint enterprise are regarded as the common socialist property of
the USSR and the relevant CMEA member county."'159
The second example of recent efforts to strengthen the integration
of the socialist community is taken from the "Legislative Plan for 1986-
1990," published on August 28, 1986,160 which provided for changes to
be introduced in Part IV of the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legisla-
tion during the first half of 1990. Part IV deals with Copyright Legisla-
tion. Having been forced to renounce many so-called "socialist"
156. LEPESHKIN, supra note 107, at 12.
157. See Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 49, 0 poriadke sozdaniia na
territorii SSSR i deiatel'nosti sovmestnykh predpriiatii s uchastiem sovetskikh organizatsii ifirm
kapitalisticheskikh i razvivaiushchikhsia stran [On Procedures Governing the Creation and Opera-
tion on the Territory of the USSR ofJoint Enterprises Involving Soviet Organizations and Firms
from Capitalist and Developing Countries], Jan. 13, 1987, SP SSSR 1987, No. 9, item 40.
For English translation and commentary, see M. BOGUSLAVSKY & P. SMIRNOV, THE
REORGANIZATION OF SoviET FOREIGN TRADE: LEGAL ASPECTS 81-109, 173-81 (S.
Levitsky ed. 1989).
158. See Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 48, 0 poriadhe sozdaniia na
territorii SSSR i deiatel'nosti sovmestnykh predpriiatii mezhdunarodnykh ob "edinenii i organizat-
sii SSSR i drugikh stran - chlenov SEV[On Procedures Governing the Creation and Operation on
the Territory of the USSR ofJoint Enterprises, International Assodations and Organizations of
the USSR and Other CMEA Member Countries], Jan. 13, 1987, SP SSSR 1987, No. 8, item
38. For English translation and commentary, see BOGUSLAVSKY & SMIRNOV, supra
note 157, at 81-109, 186-97.
159. BOGUSLAVSKY & SMIRNOV, supra note 157, at 191.
160. Edict of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Aug. 28, 1986, Ved.
Verkh. Soy. SSSR 1986, No. 37, item 782, cl. 18.
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features of the Soviet copyright system as the result of the Soviet acces-
sion in 1973 to the Universal Copyright Convention (albeit in its 1952
version),' 6 ' the draftsmen of the new Soviet copyright law were deter-
mined to ensure the socialist character of Soviet copyright law. By grad-
ual harmonization, later to be followed by standardization and
unification, the principal concepts and institutions of copyright within
what was referred to as the "Socialist Commonwealth" were eventually
to culminate in the establishment of a multilateral copyright convention
grouping all socialist countries.1 6 2 This was conceded to be a long-term
project, 16 3 but the present Soviet network of bilateral copyright conven-
tions with other socialist countries had been planned with such an even-
tuality in mind, 16 and the "working agreements" reached between the
copyright agencies of the socialist countries were expected to play a
major role in bringing about such a multilateral socialist copyright con-
vention.16 5 Until 1989, the trends in perestroika did not contradict this
long-term goal, although there was no explicit commitment to it on the
part of the Soviet Union's partners in the "Socialist Commonwealth."
At the present time such schemes to integrate the socialist nations
are presumably in a holding pattern as, until the first meeting of the
"post-reform" CMEA in January 1990, the main priority of the East
European countries and main concern of the West was in obtaining
161. On amendment of the Soviet copyright legislation in connection with accession of the
USSR to the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952, May 27, 1973, Ved. Verkh. Soy.
SSSR 1973, No. 9, item 138; Ved. Verkh. Soy. RSFSR 1974, No. 10, item 286; Ved.
Verkh. Soy. SSSR 1976, No. 42, item 585; Ved. Verkh. Soy. RSFSR 1976, No. 42,
item 1270. See also Levitsky, Soviet Copyright Law at the Crossroads, J. OF MEDIA L. AND
PRAc., May 1983, at 3-35. On partial retreat from the "socialist approach" to copy-
right as the result of the accession to the UCC, see S. LEvrrsKY, The Union of Berne at
100: What Keeps the Superpowers Away? Thoughts and Apprehensions, in LAW AND THE
GORBACHEV ERA 271, 330, n.306 and accompanying text (D. Barry ed., Law in East-
em Europe No. 39, 1988).
162. See Levitsky, in [Changes in the Fundamental Principles of USSR Civil Legis-
lation, Part IV: Copyright], text accompanying footnotes 125-29 (forthcoming, No.
41 in the series Law in Eastern Europe); MATVEEV, MEZHDUNARODNAIA OKHRANA
AVTORSKIKH PRAV [INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION] 98-106, 186-95 (1987).
163. Levitsky, supra note 162, at 229, n.126; MATVEEV, supra note 162, at 110ff; V.
SHATROV, MEZHDUNARODNOE SOTRUDNICHESTVO V OBLASTI IZOBRETATEL'SKOGO I
AVTORSKOGO PRAVA [INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE LAw OF INVENTION AND OF
COPYRIGHT] 7, 194-209, 217-21 (1982).
164. See Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 819, On Bilateral Agreements
with Socialist Countries Concerning Reciprocal Protection of Copyrights, Aug. 29, 1967, SP
MOLD. SSR 1972, No. 11, item 156, at 771. See also Decree of the USSR Council of
Ministers No. 762, On Bilateral Agreements with Socialist Countries Concerning Reciprocal
Protection of Copyrights, Oct. 19, 1972, SP MOLD. SSR 1972, No. 11, item 157, pp. 769-
71 (for Amendments, see SP MOLD. SSR 1974, No. 8, item 102, at 699-701). See also
Levitsky, Continuity and Change in Soviet Copyright Law: A LegalAnalysis, 6 Rev. of Social-
ist L. 451-52 & n.95-98 (1980).
165. Levitsky, supra note 164, at 451; TURKIN, Dvustoronnie soglasheniia o vzaimnoi
okhrane avtorskikh pray mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami [Bilateral Agree-
ments on Reciprocal Protection of Copyrights Between the USSR and Other Socialist Countries, in
PROBLEMY SOVETSKOGO AVTORSKOGO PRAVA [PROBLEMS IN SOVIET COPYRIGHT LAw] 14
(Boguslavskii, Gavrilov & Chernysheva, eds. 1979); MATVEEV, supra note 162, at 101,
189.
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assurances from President Gorbachev that he would not resort to the
Brezhnev doctrine - or the Khrushchev doctrine, I should say-in
thwarting the evolution in Eastern Europe towards democracy and, in
most cases, away from communism. It is a tribute to Gorbachev's polit-
ical realism that he not only refused to intervene militarily to stop the
Eastern European uprisings, but actually lauded them as a natural exten-
sion of his own perestroika. "I am encouraged and inspired by all these
processes," he said at Malta, 166 adding that "each people has the right
to decide, and does decide the fate of its own state." In a speech to the
Party's Central Committee on December 9, 1989, Gorbachev applied
this freedom of choice both to political forces supporting socialism and
to "those seeking other ways of social development," 16 7 although the
USSR, he said, is firmly committed to carry out perestroika "on the basis
of our own, socialist principles." Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A.
Shevardnadze found the atmosphere in post-Ceausescu Romania "abso-
lutely purifying."' 68
But if Gorbachev is a realist, he is not an opportunist. Even when
he faced the dissident Lithuanian Party in Vilnius, on January 13, 1990,
he expressed the conviction that the premise of "gravitation towards
integration, towards the combining of efforts in the economy, science
and politics does not contradict but is also inseparably connected with
the upsurge of national awareness and national self-affirmation.' 6 9
Gorbachev must obviously have had in mind the integration movement
in Western Europe. But the Lithuanians were not listening that closely
or with sufficient interest.
Representatives of the member countries of Comecon met in Sofia on
January 9, 1990, for the first time since the dramatic political upheavals
of the closing months of the previous year.170 The results were predict-
able - up to a point. Members wished to assert their newly gained
independence by criticizing every aspect of the alliance, from the rigid
planning of intra-group trade to CMEA's archaic structure and Soviet
dominance of the group. But when the Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai I.
Ryzhkov presented a proposal for dropping Soviet subsidies to member
countries' economies and switching to trade on a hard currency basis
and in real world market prices, there was an outcry: you can't do this to
us! 171
Up to now the Soviet Union's principal shipments to CMEA mem-
bers consisted of subsidized oil and gas, which could easily be sold on
world markets, while its partners' exports to the Soviet Union were
166. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1989, at A12, col. 5.
167. Id., Dec. 12, 1989, at A18, col. 5.
168. Id.,Jan. 7, 1990, at A1, col. 3.
169. Id.,Jan. 15, 1990, at A9, col. 2.
170. See Clines, Soviets and Partners Say Comecon Needs Repair, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1990, at A13, col. 1; Haberman, Moscow Proposes That Trade Bloc Begin Using Real Mar-
ket Prices, id., Jan. 10, 1990, at A1, col. 3; and Passell, Unsnarling a Tangled Trade Alli-
ance, id. at Al 1, col. 4.
171. Haberman, supra note 170, at Al; Passell, id. at All.
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mostly shoddy manufactured goods that had little value on any market
in any currency. Better-quality goods were reserved for export outside
CMEA. The Hungarian delegate complained that billion-ruble sur-
pluses in the trade with the Soviet Union would turn overnight into bil-
lion-dollar deficits, while others criticized Soviet demands for a quick
settlement of accounts (to permit the Soviet Union to raise billions of
dollars for the import of consumer goods). The Soviet Union was asked
to write off the deficits as aid to its CMEA partners "to which they were
entitled." 17 2
But there was agreement on the new functions of CMEA: integra-
tion and multilateral projects were out, while bilateral trade agreements
were in, with CMEA serving as an umbrella organization for regional
trade. 173 Khrushchev's dream of using CMEA as an instrument for
eventual simultaneous transition to communism went up in smoke, as
may have the Soviet plan for transforming CMEA into a trade organism
based on free-market principles, at least for the foreseeable future.
Comecon itself, however, appears to be here to stay.
10. Khrushchev's Blueprint for Socialist Development and Its Fate
In the final analysis, Khrushchev, by repudiating in 1959 Stalin's doc-
trines of "Socialism in One Country" and "Capitalist Encirclement,"
had hoped to give the rank-and-file the distinct conviction that after the
ossification of Marxism under Stalin and its virtual irrelevance after the
Nineteenth Party Congress 17 4 (except for Stalin's warning that class
struggle will become more acute with the advance of socialism, hardly a
Marxist tenet), 175 the dialectical process of history did move along its
pre-ordained tracks, and a new stage in that process had been reached:
the beginning of the process of building integral communism.
Khrushchev sought to erase in the Soviet people's minds the picture of
172. "Unless the Soviet Union agrees to maintain the current pattern of trade sub-
sidies for several years, manufacturing industries in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
East Germany could be devastated... [and] the West could end up paying the bill."
Passell, supra note 170, at All. But see Clyde H. Farnsworth, writing in the N.Y.
Times exactly one month earlier, "Hungary has moved to have its trade with the
Soviet Union settled in dollars instead of rubles .... Other Eastern European gov-
ernments are also seeking to free themselves from the ruble .. " N.Y. Times, Dec.
9, 1989, at 34, col. 1.
173. See Haberman, Soviet Bloc Trade Group Says It Needs to Make Big Changes, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 1990, at A14, col. 1. "Reuters quoted a Soviet delegate, Deputy
Prime Minister Stepan A. Sitaryan, a [sic] saying today that Moscow 'would agree on
pricing and payment conditions with each country on a bilateral basis.' But, he said,
'prices must come closer to world market values.'" Id. at col. 4.
174. See N. TiMASHEFF, THE GREAT RETREAT (1946); Idem, Okamenenie kommunis-
ticheskogo stroia [The Ossification of the Communist System], 30 Novwi ZHURNAL 213-24(1952). Timasheff traces the decline of Communist ideology as an active ingredient
in the building of Soviet society under Stalin. See also Labedz, supra note 105, at 3-5;
and CRANKSHAW, supra note 97, at 17 ("The guiding Party lost its dynamism and its
authority").
175. See Stalin, Ekonomicheskie problemy sotsializma v SSSR [Economic Problems of Social-
ism in the USSR], 18 BOL'SHEVIK 1-50 (1952); reprinted in Pravda, Oct. 3-4, 1952 (also
published in English as a separate pamphlet).
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an isolated socialist country on the defensive toward the capitalist world
and to replace this image with one of a victorious socialist society, capa-
ble of neutralizing potential threats from all opponents and gradually
driving the U.S. and other foreign class enemies into an isolated posi-
tion where, as one British observer had put it, some American theoreti-
cian will have to invent the doctrine of "Capitalism in One Country.' 76
To give his blueprint substance, Khrushchev went beyond mere
lofty new theories by proposing and establishing institutions to imple-
ment his ideas, institutions that were gradually to replace the State
which was to slowly wither away even before the stage of integral com-
munism had been reached. Some of these institutions are still in place,
although not always too conspicuously (as evidenced by the comrades'
courts, 17 7 for example), while others, such as the anti-parasite laws,
were abolished many years ago. 178 Several others, including the citi-
zens' or "territorial" army as Khrushchev called it, have never left the
drawing board. 179 Similarly, many of the principles underlying the
functions of the State that were to continue during the building of com-
munism are either completely obsolete today or still surprisingly alive.
References to "a permanent revolution from above" (not originating
with Khrushchev but a phrase which is today curiously reminiscent of
the function that Gorbachev appeared intent on assigning to the Party
through its leadership ofperestroika);'80 an overall plan for the growth of
the Soviet economy as a whole (to which Gorbachev still subscribed in
1989 with the introduction of the 13th Five-Year Plan by Prime Minister
Ryzhkov);' 8 ' central direction of education policies; and the function of
"further strengthening and expanding the brotherly ties with countries
of the world system of socialism" (which Gorbachev has drastically
changed into "expanding cooperation"' 8 2 purely and simply, although a
176. Edward Crankshaw in a (possibly second-hand) remark to this author in 1961.
177. See, e.g., F. Gorl6, The Latest Developments in the Area of Comradely Justice, in PER-
SPECTIVES ON SOVIET LAW FOR THE 1980s 171 (F. Feldbrugge & W. Simons, eds., Law
in Eastern Europe No. 24, 1982); F. Gorl6, Comrades' Courts, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET
LAw supra note 90, at 153-57.
178. See, e.g., W. CONNOR, DEVIANCE IN SOVIET SOCIETY 196-98 (1972); THE NEW
JUSTICE IN THE USSR 8-9 (Soviet Affairs Notes No. 239, Mar. 28, 1960). Anti-parasite
laws were in effect during 1957-70. Under these laws, persons convicted of "parasit-
ism" were sent into exile by the local soviets or by the people's court acting as admin-
istrative agencies. See also Beermann, The Law Against Parasites, Tramps and Beggars, 11
SOVIET STUD. 453-55 (1960); H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR 291-98 (2d ed. 1963).
179. See Khrushchev's Report to the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet
(Fifth Convocation), Jan. 14, 1960, reprinted in KRASNAIA ZVEZDA, Mar. 4, 1960 (pam-
phlet printed in English, titled On the Future of the Standing Army). See also Stevens,
Soviets Blueprint Territorial Army, Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 23, 1960, at 15 and
Pravda, Feb. 23, 1960.
180. Pravda, Nov. 26, 1989, at 2.
181. Prime Minister N. I. Ryzhkov explained the basic concepts embodied in the
13th Five-Year Plan to the Deputies of the Congress in his report Effektivnost', hon-
solidatsiia, reforma - put' k zdorovoi ekonomike [Efficiency, Consolidation, Reform - The Road
to a Healthy Economy], reprinted in Izvestiia, Dec. 14, 1989, at 3-4.
182. See, e.g.,Joint Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council
of Ministers No. 992, Aug. 19, 1986; 3 VNESHNIAIA TORGOVLIA 4-8 (Supp. 1987).
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new framework for this cooperation is in the process of being created
with the concurrence of all CMEA members), evoke strong echoes of
concepts familiar during the Khrushchev era.' 8 3
Khrushchev spoke endlessly about these and many other opera-
tional principles and functions of the State, with some of which
Gorbachev agreed. Like Khrushchev, I8 4 Gorbachev favored replacing
coercion with persuasion and prevention and stressed the need for a
wide preliminary discussion by the public at large of all major new laws
and decrees, 18 5 the assumption of some functions of the State by volun-
tary associations of citizens, 18 6 and a host of other concrete measures
which he was later to implement.
With two of Khrushchev's theses, however, Gorbachev could not
agree: (a) the growing transformation of guarantees of the rights of
individual citizens, from purely political rights to predominantly eco-
nomic and organizational rights; and (b) the gradual transfer of the
functions of justice and law enforcement to public and social organiza-
tions. 18 7 In Gorbachev's view, what individual citizen's rights lacked
were not economic guarantees, however arbitrarily enforced by the gov-
ernment, but real political substance, 18 8 while an independent judiciary
and the creation of solid foundations for a socialist Rechtsstaat in the
USSR should replace the "withering away" of formal justice. 189
By contrast, two of the "social and economic prerequisites" which
Khrushchev considered indispensable for the "withering away of the
183. See supra notes 170-73.
184. See, e.g., Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 9, col. 3; Romashkin, 'Rol' pobuzhdeniia i
prinuzhdeniia v soveiskom gosudarstve [The role of persuasion and compulsion in the
Soviet State], 2 Soy. Gos. & PRAvo 25 (1960); Up the Party, London Times, Mar. 4,
1960, at 13; 1 KOMMUNIST 10-24 (1960); Pravda, Feb. 25, 1960; id, Mar. 11, 1960; id.,
Mar. 13, 1960.
185. Romashkin, supra note 184, at 20-21. Gorbachev was instrumental in imple-
menting such a consultatio per turbam with the adoption of USSR Law No. 7286-XI, 0
vsenarodnom obsuzhdenii vazhnykh voprosov gosudarstvennoi zhizni [On Nationwide Discussion
of Major Questions of Public Life] (consultative referendum), June 30, 1987, Ved. Verkh.
Soy. SSSR 1987, No. 26, item 387, at 464-69.
186. Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 9, col. 3; D. KERIMOV, V. PETROv & B. SHEINDLIN,
Uchenie Marksizma-Leninizma o sotsialisticheskom gosudarstve i prave [Marxist-Leninist Teach-
ing About the Socialist State and Law], in SOROK LET SovrrsKoGO PRAVA [40 YEARS OF
SoviEr LAv] 19-31 (1957). See also supra note 107. This principle has, thus far, found
its most prominent expression in Gorbachev's Law on Cooperatives May 26, 1988.
USSR Law No. 8998-XI, 0 kooperatsii v SSSR [On the Cooperative System in the USSR], of
May 26, 1988, Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR 1988, No. 22, item 355, at 375-421.
187. See KONST. SSSR, ch. X (1936). B. PONOMAREV, KoNsrrrtrrsiA SSSR - POLI-
TIKO- PRAVOVOI KOMMENTARII [CoNsTrTUTiON OF THE USSR - POLITICAL AND LEGAL
COMMENTARY] 137-38 (1982). See also supra notes 177-78.
188. Pravda, Nov. 26, 1989, at 2.
189. Id.; Gorbachev, Perestroika i prava cheloveka [Perestroika and Human Rights], in 0
khode realizatsii reshenii XXVII S"ezda i zadachakh po uglubleniiu perestroiki [On the Progress in
Implementing the Decisions of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU and the Tasks in Intensifying
Perestroika], Report of the Secretary-General of the CPSU Central Committee to the
XIXth All-Union CPSU Conference, June 28, 1988, reprinted in 10 KOMMUNiST 26-29
(1988). See also Sharlet, Party and Public Ideals in Conflict: Constitutionalism and Civil
Rights in the USSR, 23 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 601 (1990).
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State" survived under Gorbachev's perestroika, not as conditions for the
transition from "mature socialism" to integral communism, but as indis-
pensable conditions if the Soviet Union was to be a viable socialist soci-
ety tout court: rise in the living standards of the population, 190 including
Khrushchev's emphasis on greater technological know-how, and the rad-
ical improvement of housing conditions. They remain important objec-
tives under Gorbachev's perestroika.'91 Khrushchev's insistence on
reducing the prices of consumer goods,' 92 on the other hand, is cur-
rently the subject of an agonizing tug-of-war between those in the Soviet
Union (including Gorbachev) who are looking for a quick transition to
real market prices and the elimination of subsidies, and an opposing
camp (including Gorbachev) who see the need for price controls lest the
spiraling consumer prices, particularly those charged by the coopera-
tives, result in intolerable social problems and summon the spectre of
destructive inflation. 19 3
Khrushchev took some concrete but often misguided steps towards
the creation of eventual "material abundance." But, carried away by his
own enthusiasm, he deluded himself by the conviction - or was it but
an empty boast? - that the Soviet Union under his leadership could
exceed the per capita output of the U.S. and achieve the highest living
standard in the world by about 1970.194
190. N. Khrushchev, Report to the Extraordinary XXIth Congress of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union, Jan. 27, 1959, reprinted in Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959.
191. Khrushchev believed in 1959 that "Full satisfaction, within necessary and rea-
sonable bounds, of the requirements of all Soviet citizens as regards food, housing
and clothing is probably a matter of the not-too-far-distant future." Id. See also Sos-
novy, The Soviet Housing Situation Today, 11 SOVIET STUD. 1-21 (1959); Beermann, Legal
Implications of the 1957 Housing Decree, 11 SOVIET STUD. 109-116 (1959). For a Western
discussion of the Soviet record in social welfare after Stalin, see the symposium,
Toward a 'Communist Welfare State, 9 PROBS. OF COMMUNISM 1-22 (1960); Goldman,
The Soviet Standard of Living and Ours, 38 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 625-37 (1960). On the
"right to housing" (pravo na zhilishche) in the 1977 USSR Constitution, see KONST.
SSSR, art. 44; PONOMAREV, supra note 187, at 148-51.
192. Such a policy had already been formulated by Stalin. See I CURRENT SOVIET
POLICIES 14 (1953).
193. See supra notes 68, 71-73. See also USSR law, 0 vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v
Zakon SSSR '0 kooperatsii v SSSR'[On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the
Law of the USSR 'On Cooperatives in the USSR'], Oct. 16, 1989, reprinted in Pravda, Oct.
21, 1989, at 1, and Izvestiia, Oct. 21, 1989, at 1; Sennagoz, Tsel'-sderzhat'rost tsen[The
Goal - To Halt Rising Prices], 26 PRAvrrEL'STVENNYI VESTNIK 8 (1989); Romaniuk,
Tovasy i tseny [Goods and Prices] (press conference of Deputy Prime Minister L. Abalkin
in the Council of Ministers), reprinted in Izvestiia, Nov. 12, 1989, at 1; On the Progress in
Implementing the Decisions of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU and the Tasks in Intensifying
Perestroika, supra note 189, at 13-14; Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 0
dopolnitel'nykh merakh po stabilizatsii potrebitel'skogo rynka i usileniiu gosudarstvennogo kon-
trolia za tsenami [On Further Measures to Stabilize the Consumer Market and to Strengthen
Government Supervision of Prices], Nov. 20, 1989, reprinted in Izvestiia, Nov. 25, 1989.
194. Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959; Khrushchev's Report to the 22nd Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Oct. 17, 1961; Idem's Report on the Pro-
gramme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Reply to Discussion, Oct.
18, 1961; PROGRAMME OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (1961). See
also supra note 96.
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Khrushchev soon departed from the political scene in the Soviet
Union, somewhat in haste, to be succeeded by what today is officially
characterized as "a period of stagnation." No one took Khrushchev's
boast seriously, but the severity of the economic crisis in the USSR today
is deadly serious indeed. The expectations of an ongoing transition to
integral communism, enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution of
1977,195 have given way to a wholesale defacto rejection of the claims
made in the Preamble and in many chapters of the Constitution itself.
With all the countries of Eastern Europe except Albania, and Romania
off and on, having rejected the monopoly of the Party as the leader in
building the future society, will the Soviet Union elect to return to build-
ing "Socialism in One Country," once again?
On November 26, 1989, Mikhail S. Gorbachev attempted to answer
this question1 9 6 and thereby to place his perestroika into the context of
Marxist-Leninist ideology. The interplay between pragmatism and ide-
ology was given a more tangible frame of reference than at any time
since the launching ofperestroika in April 1985. Because flexibility is one
of the characteristic features of the new path to socialism under
Gorbachev, the new blueprint of socialist construction itself appears to
have been often dictated by considerations of expediency.
11. The Marxist-Leninist Apostolic Succession
a. Khrushchev's Claim to Lenin's Mantle
There is a kind of "apostolic succession" within the Communist move-
ment. The only way for Khrushchev to lay claim to Lenin's mantle was
to achieve recognition as an authoritative interpreter and custodian of
Marxist dogmas. Khrushchev's "theses" on the transition of society to
integral communism were his most important single effort in this direc-
tion. His contribution to doctrine, however, such as it was, was soon
forgotten, and today he is chiefly remembered as the leader who
launched de-Stalinization in his country and initiated a short-lived cul-
tural thaw.
b. Gorbachev's Ideological Claim to Leadership of the Communist
Movement
Gorbachev's own claim to Marxist-Leninist apostolic succession was vir-
tually forced upon him as his country, and the Communist movement at
large, began to feel uneasy and impatient after almost five years of wait-
ing to discover what he was up to apart from trying to save the Soviet
Union from economic ruin. How could Gorbachev, who liked to say "we
must act as good bolsheviks" 19 7 and who declared passionately at the
Second Congress of the People's Deputies in December 1989 that he
195. KONST. SSSR, preamble, reprinted in Izvestiia, Oct. 8, 1977, at 3-6; USSR Law,
Oct. 7, 1977, Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR 1977, No. 41, item 619. For English translation,
see 4 REV. OF SOCIALIST L. 57-58 (1978).
196. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1-3.
197. See, e.g., 10 KOMMUNIST 50 (1988).
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was a "convinced Communist" for whom communism was not a fantasy
but his main goal,19 8 go on changing, and then modifying anew, con-
cepts and institutions that not only were often at odds with accepted
ways of doing things but sometimes seemed to defy Marx himself, with-
out articulating his own interpretation of The Creed? I-ow long could
he delay defining his vision of the future in the name of which all these
changes under perestroika were being made?
Prior to giving expression to his practical program for building
socialism, endorsed by the Plenum of the Central Committee on Febru-
ary 7, 1990,199 in the Draft of a new Party "platform," Gorbachev's clos-
est approximation of the new communist manifesto (and explanation of
his motives) was contained in an article he wrote as a "synthesis" of his
views in November 1989 - three decades after Khrushchev's
blueprint-under the title "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Per-
estroika.'" 20 0 Only history will show whether "Z" of Daedalus fame was
right that Gorbachev's perestroika, too, will pass and. "Sovietism," pre-
sumably a concept coined by the masked author of "To the Stalin Mau-
soleum," will inevitably revert to a totalitarian dictatorship. 20 ' To our
understanding of the present, this is just as irrelevant as are George
Ginsburgs' continued attempts to publish his views on the post-per-
estroika political and legal system without bothering to warn his intended
readers that "the new state," which will "largely coincide with the area
inhabited by people of Great Russian stock," 20 2 is still only a figment of
a political scientist's imagination. While "Z" and George Ginsburgs, the
distinguished professor of law at Rutgers, wait for their predictions for
perestroika to materialize, let us grant Gorbachev his own day in court to
explain and defend his faith in perestroika's (and communism's) future.
Gorbachev's arguments can be summed up in six propositions:
i. Perestroika Is Revolutionary
Gorbachev characterizes perestroika as "revolutionary"; this is apt
because the restructuring is to affect not merely the superstructure of
Soviet society, but its economic basis as well. It is revolutionary because
Gorbachev had the courage to say that Marx was wrong on a number of
issues and even Lenin was not always right. Perestroika is revolutionary
because it aims to eliminate, step by step, the distortions of socialism
198. See Clines, Enough for Glasnost?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1989, at A19.
199. See Pravda, Feb. 6, 1990, at 1-2; Izvestiia, Feb. 13, 1990, at 1-2; Gorbachev Calls
on Party to Forgo Power Monopoly, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1990, at Al; Soviet Leaders Agree to
Surrender Communist Party Monopoly on Power, id., Feb. 8, 1990, at Al; Party's Agenda:
Liberty and Justice, id., Feb. 14, 1990, at A12.
200. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1-3.
201. See supra note 95.
202. See G. Ginsburgs, Post-Perestroika and the Prospects for Criminal Law: An Early
Prognosis (unpublished manuscript submitted for publication in June 1989, in which
the author attempts to answer the questions: "[W]hat kind of political system is likely
to be established in Russia in the aftermath of the old Soviet regime and its current
mutant?" and "[W]hat in the Soviet criminal law portfolio can be retained in the
successor era?").
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imposed by Stalin and to make up for the failure of socialism to renew
itself, resulting in a state of stagnation and acute economic crisis.20 3
ii. Where Marx Went Wrong
Marx was wrong, according to Gorbachev, because having endowed his
doctrines with the twin attributes of universality and inevitability, he under-
estimated capitalism's capacity for re-vitalization and evolution (a) by
incorporating many of socialism's own programs and achievements, as a
result of the long coexistence of socialism and capitalism which Marx
had not foreseen, 20 4 and (b) by drawing new strength from the opportu-
nities offered by the scientific-technical revolution, while socialism
lingered on in self-imposed isolation or wallowed in stagnation and
decline.20 5 Carpe diem became, by default, a capitalist monopoly. Marx
was wrong, Gorbachev contended, because the capitalist approach to
ownership and property has evolved beyond the validity of laws which
Marx had deemed immutable.2 0 6
iii. The Fraudulent "Socialism" of the Preamble to the 1977
Constitution
The "mature socialism" embodied in the Preamble to the Constitu-
tion of 1977 is a fraud. The founders of Marxism never conceived of
socialism as a ready-made, rigid mold into which real life was to be
squeezed.2 0 7 Lenin searched constantly for better models and more sat-
isfying solutions to the social, political, economic, and cultural problems
of the new society and defied prevailing dogmas when necessary (as was
the case with NEP).2 08 Perestroika follows a similar method to eradicate
Stalin's perversions of the socialist idea, by dismantling his authoritarian
command economy based on administrative fiat, tolerating no alterna-
tives, disassembling his centralized bureaucratic machinery which sur-
vived the de-Stalinization of the 20th Party Congress, and rebuilding
true socialism, a process that will stretch well into the 21st century.
iv. Gorbachev's "Socialism with a Human Face"
Gorbachev's "true socialism" is "socialism with a human face." 20 9 It
assumes that "political expediency will never prevail over formal laws,"
and its institutions include parliamentary democracy in a future genuine
Rechtsstaat.2 10 A major effort will be required to reach Western levels of
applied science and high technology, but no more boasts of "we shall
catch up and surpass" will be heard.
203. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1-3.
204. Id. at 1.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. See also Gorbachev Article Excerpts: A New Aspect of Socalism, N.Y. Times, Nov.
27, 1989, at A12, col. 1.
208. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1-2.
209. Id. at 2 (chelovecheskii oblik).
210. Id. (pravovoe gosudarstvo).
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Two features of the new socialist model may hold surprises for
some. The first of these is diversification of the forms of ownership in the
USSR, which has become one of the tenets of Gorbachev's perestroika and
an element of his new socialism. 2 11 Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov's
Report to the Supreme Soviet graphically illustrates the extent of
etatisation of the entire structure of ownership that has taken place in
the USSR since Stalin;21 2 moreover, this process continued into the
fourth year of perestroika. In 1970, Ryzhkov pointed out, 83% of the
Soviet economy was in the hands of the State; in 1988, the State's share
was close to 90%.213 The relative share of personal ownership, on the
other hand, decreased during this same period even more rapidly: from
8.6% in 1970 to a mere 3.4% in 1988.
This lopsided distribution of ownership is expected to change more
or less rapidly once the Draft Law on Ownership, still at the stage of
deliberation in the Soviet parliament as of mid-February 1990,214 is
promulgated and the new institutions and establishments endowed with
ownership rights are created. The Draft Law provides for de-etatisation
of ownership by diversification of the kinds of property that are pro-
tected by law, although the divestment by the State of its property is not
expressly tied to a potential "withering away of the State." It provides
for a pluralistic approach to ownership based on territorial or organiza-
tional criteria, as well as on the nature of property (e.g., intellectual
property) 2 15 or the owner's legal status (e.g., lease-holder's property;
individual or joint ownership). While personal ownership is considered
in the Draft Law both as individual and as social ownership, private own-
ership is still forbidden; religious organizations, however, may acquire
property for the discharge of religious purposes.2 16
Two statements made by Ryzhkov sum up the scope and the signifi-
cance of this aspect of perestroika for the dismantling of the old Stalinist
model of Soviet economy: (a) The success of perestroika as a whole, he
claimed, echoing Gorbachev himself, will greatly depend on the pro-
gress in restructuring the system of ownership. For etatisation of own-
ership had given birth to what should be feared most: "the cutting off of
the tie which bound the workingman to his property, an alienation of the
sense of ownership," whereas "the only means of creating an interest in
productive work on the part of its producer is the interest flowing from
ownership"; and (b) "for all practical purposes, all restrictions on own-
ership of any kind have been removed from the exercise of individual
211. Id. at 2, col. 6.
212. Ryzhkov, Strategii uglubleniia ekonomicheskoi reformy - novuiu zakonodatel'nuiu
osnovu [A New Legislative Foundation for the Strategy of Intensification of the Economic Reform]
(report at the Second Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet), reprinted in Pravda, Oct.
3, 1989, at 2-4.
213. Id at 2.
214. USSR Draft Law, 0 sobstvennosti v SSSR [On Ownership in the USSR], Nov. 14,
1989, reprinted in Pravda, Nov. 18, 1989, at 3, and Izvestiia, Nov. 18, 1989, at 1-2.
215. Id., art. 4, para. 3.
216. Id., art. 21.
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economic labor activity." 2 17
A second feature of Gorbachev's view of socialism is that it plays
down Marx's main law governing the historical process: the "'struggle of
classes."' 2 18 With respect to Soviet society, this implies his acceptance of
the concept of an "all-people's state," enshrined in the Preamble to the
1977 Constitution and in article 1, despite the avowed continued exist-
ence of at least three social classes - a purely non-Marxist concept.2 19
Gorbachev himself asks the crucial question: If today's socialism
stands for universal values and ideals, what is the proper class approach
to such a proposition? One quotation from Marx and Engels2 20 con-
tains Gorbachev's answer: "[t]he struggle for the liberation of the work-
ing class does not mean a struggle for class privileges and monopolies
but equal rights and duties and the eradication of all class domi-
nance." 2 21 Marx came through, once again. Gorbachev, therefore,
urges increased knowledge of the needs and interests of all classes and
social groups in Soviet society, in order to better satisfy them under
perestroika.
Gorbachev's special appeal, however, is directed at the intelligentsia
(not the Lumpenproletariat or the "working class"). He wants to make up
for decades of lost opportunities by assigning to the intelligentsia, and
the professional classes in general, a special role in the process of per-
estroika; their social role, he asserts, and the value assigned to creative
and intellectual pursuits must be raised, for socialism will have no
appeal to humanity unless the scientists, the artists, and all the creators
are in the front ranks of perestroika, not at the tail end of a social class
hierarchy. 2 22 Gorbachev adds, for the benefit of the non-intellectuals,
that socialism will have no future unless it can unleash the creative ener-
gies of all individuals, whatever their class affiliation. Perhaps
Gorbachev's record in this direction does not, thus far, bode well for the
future of socialism; but, once again, this is beside the point. Or is it?
v. Gorbachev's Global Socialism
Gorbachev's socialism will continue to be built on a global basis. 223
It will not, however, be built "in common" as Khrushchev understood it,
i.e., in a uniform and planned manner, under Soviet leadership, or as a
prelude to the "simultaneous transition to integral communism." Per-
haps a more accurate way of expressing what Gorbachev's "global"
217. Ryzhkov, supra note 212, at 2.
218. Gorbachev, supra note 49, 2-3. The "non-confrontational" approach towards
other classes and different socio-political formations was later enshrined in the Draft
Platform to the Twenty-eighth Party Congress, infra note 242. See supra note 199; and
K gumannomu, demokraticheskomu sotsializmu [Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism],
Pravda, Feb. 13, 1990, at 1-2.
219. KONST. SSSR, preamble and art. 1.
220. K. MARX & F. ENGELS, 16 WORKS 12 (Russian ed.).
221. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 2.
222. Id. at 3.
223. Id. at 1-3. See also "Platform," infra note 242, pts. I, VI.
Cornell International Law Journal
socialism stands for is (1) the greater influence of foreign socialist move-
ments on the formation of progressive socialism in the Soviet Union;
and (2) socialism's increased role in solving global problems.
(1) In building "new" socialism underperestroika, the Soviet Union is
not left without models and precedents, as it had been during Stalin's
"Socialism in One Country." It can draw lessons from its own experi-
ence as well as take into account the vast experience already accumu-
lated by the socialist movement in all parts of the world.
There is a long record of building socialism within a socialist political
formation (in Eastern Europe, China, and elsewhere); that experience has
not been lost for perestroika. Furthermore, there is the contribution
made to socialism by reform groups in other political formations, including
capitalism. "We are aware of," Gorbachev said, "and have due esteem
for, the achievements of Social Democracy on behalf of the socialist
idea, and the social reforms it has inspired, contributing to the well-
being of the populations in the capitalist countries. '224
The Soviet Union no longer considers that there is only one correct
path to socialism. "Socialism is not something that has been given once
and for all time," Gorbachev argues. Disagreeing with Marx, he con-
tends: "we have no monopoly on truth."' 225 Each country must build
socialism in its own way and according to its own model predicated on
its historical, cultural, and ethnic heritage and the level of its present
economic development. 2 26 The Soviet Union can only benefit by the
expanded range of possible solutions, drawing lessons from both suc-
cessful and failed experiments in other countries and other socio-polit-
ical environments.
Finally, there is an undeniable benefit for socialism in studying and
integrating capitalist experiences, in the same manner as capitalism itself has
benefited from the socialist experience and has actually evolved under
its influence. Socialism, too, is capable of evolving. Of particular value is the
manner in which capitalism has taken advantage of the vast opportuni-
ties created by the Scientific-Technical Revolution which occurred while
socialism was asleep. 22 7 Socialism can also learn from capitalism about
new techniques (managerial, informational) and new institutions (diver-
sity of ownership, variety of forms to organize industrial production).
There is, in Gorbachev's opinion, no contradiction in adopting the
tools and techniques used by reformed capitalism in the construction of
224. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1; and Draft Platform, infra note 242, pt. II.
225. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1, col. 6; id. at 2, col. 3.
226. Id. at 1, cols. 5-6.
227. Id. at 1, col. 4; id. at 2, cols. 2, 7. One finds here a distant echo - if not
confirmation - of Raymond Aron's argument that scientific and technological revo-
lutions - not capitalism itself, as the Marxists maintained - were the central feature
of modem life. It is because of the scientific and technological revolution that capi-
talism today, on Gorbachev's own admission, is no longer what it was in the days of
Marx. See generally R. ARON, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: AN
ESSAY ON THE LIMITS OF HISTORICAL OBJECTIVITY 122 (trans. ed. 1961). See also text
accompanying notes 205 & 228.
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revitalized socialism, because (a) some processes of economic develop-
ment are quite similar in socialism and capitalism; and (b) because not
all tools that are "modem" or "advanced" are, by that fact, "capitalist,"
even when devised under capitalism. This is quite acceptable as long as
the interests of individuals remain the purpose rather than mere instru-
ment of the reformers' goals. 228
(2) Gorbachev's global socialism also presupposes that under per-
estroika, socialism will acquire many features and preoccupations that are
not purely socialist but are shared by all societies molded by today's
global threats and universal aspirations that overshadow narrower
concerns.
According to Gorbachev, "[g]lobal problems have reached such
proportions that without taking them into account it is now impossible
to arrive at realistic views about current trends in societal development,
or the future of mankind." 22 9
Beyond purely socialist concerns there lies a common heritage of
cultural, moral-ethical, and legal values: concepts ofjustice, supremacy
of law and freedom of the individual that supersede the confines of a
superstructure built by a class for its own particular interests. In defense
of these common values of our threatened civilization we must forsake
confrontation between socialism and capitalism and learn to cooperate.
Gorbachev lists economic values among these common values: the prin-
ciples of production and exchange of goods based on the laws of value
and cost ("ekvivalentnyi obmen" and "zakon stoimosti"). He does not
elaborate. 23 0
Socialism cannot exist in a vacuum, and its activities are likely to be
increasingly influenced by common global problems and values, includ-
ing concern for peace and security, freedom, and self-determination.
Under perestroika, socialism in the Soviet Union will endeavor to contrib-
ute to the building of a more humane and rational society within the
framework of a common civilization, without abandoning its own values
and priorities. 23 1
vi. The Decline of Khrushchev's Blueprint for Integral Communism
"Integral communism" is not coming, at least not for a very long
time, according to Gorbachev. It was clearly wrong for Khrushchev to
assume that with the removal of Stalinism as a brake on normal societal
development, the creative forces of socialism would be freed and the
high~st stage of socialism, i.e., communism, would prevail within a gen-
eration's time. A new utopia was presented to the Soviet people, laden
with exaggeration and oversimplification. 23 2 Khrushchev and his imme-
diate successors came from the same rigid ideological mold as Stalin
228. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1, col. 3; id. at 2, cols. 2, 4, 6, 7.
229. Id. at 1, col. 5.
230. Id. at 2, col. 3.
231. Id. at 2, col. 3; id. at 3, cols. 7-8.
232. Id. at 2, cols. 2, 5.
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himself. So much for Khrushchev's blueprint for "transition to integral
communism."
Never again, Gorbachev contends, must immutable theoretical
models, blueprints and timetables, however superficially attractive, be
imposed upon the Soviet people, for pragmatic reality to be squeezed
into them by decree. Rather, life itself must determine the paths along
which society will evolve. Gorbachev pointed out that neither Marx nor
other classics of Marxism have ever built models for future communist
society, much less speculated about the details of its organization. 23 3 At
best they would use very general summaries of trends and tendencies in
social evolution as a "compass" 'in the transformation of social prac-
tices. 23 4 "We do not know," Lenin wrote, "and have no way of know-
ing, the stages or the practical measures by means of which mankind will
reach [communism]. '"235
Gorbachev assures the readers that there were no plans under per-
estroika to impose communism by decree. Perestroika itself, he argues,
which is the stage of renewal of socialism, does not follow any predeter-
mined dogmatic schemes but evolves as the result of analysis and syn-
thesis of actual trends in society which are subject to change and of a
contest of conflicting views and ideas about the meaning of these trends.
Gorbachev expected that perestroika would continue during the balance
of the 20th century and extend into the 21st.23 6
According to Gorbachev, the Soviet Union still has a long way to go
before it can talk about transition to communism. It must create the
prerequisites for self-government as a first step, and it must master to
the fullest extent possible the virtually endless opportunities offered by
the Scientific-Technical Revolution. This, too, is a prerequisite for con-
templating transition to a higher stage of socialism. Realistically, this
alone would tend to push it to a remote future. 23 7
Gorbachev slams shut further talk about future communist society
by paraphrasing Lenin, making sure to add a last word: "There is still
much that we do not know, but we hope to learn as our society goes
through the historically transitional stage ofperestroika.' ' 238
Conclusion
As a communist and social engineer, Mikhail Gorbachev described per-
estroika as a stage of societal development 2 39 during which socialism in the
Soviet Union would be purged of Stalinist and post-Stalinist "aberra-
tions," rescued from stagnation, and, at the same time, be revitalized, to
233. Id. at 1, cols. 3, 5. See, e.g., K. MARX & F. ENGELS, 22 SOCHINENIIA [WORKS]
563 (Russian ed.).
234. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1, col. 3.
235. Id. at 1, col. 5; V. LENIN, 33 COMPLETE WORKS 99 (Russian ed.).
236. Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1, col. 2.
237. Id. at I, col. 4.
238. Id. at 2, co. 2; id. at 3, col. 8.
239. Id. at 1, col. 2. The definition is his.
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enable it to fulfill the promise of 1917, and modernized so it would be
equal to the tasks facing Soviet society today. Butperestroika was also the
instrument by which this ambitious reform was to be accomplished. The
first aspect of perestroika called for a redefinition of socialism and of its
place in the development of society: a redefinition of the ideological
aspects of the reforms carried out under perestroika. The second aspect
of perestroika required a large dose of pragmatism in building a new soci-
ety, repudiating dogmatic stereotypes, experimenting with new methods
and techniques, and incorporating the applicable experience gained in
other countries and under other social systems, including capitalism.
Not surprisingly, perestroika appears to fluctuate constantly between
pragmatism and ideology. It comes across as a self-renewing phenome-
non which requires that newly-introduced laws and institutions be con-
stantly revised and adjusted in response to pragmatic needs, to be then
incorporated into the new model of socialism that is itself subject to per-
manent redefinition. Gorbachev's "manifesto" of November 1989,
"The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika,"240 represented the
ideological underpinning of his restructuring of Soviet society. But,
characteristically, in publishing it his motive was expediency, his Marx-
ism was revisionist, and his advice to forget for the foreseeable future
the advent of the communist millennium, was pragmatic and practical.
Gorbachev's volte-face, in prevailing upon the Plenum of the Party's
Central Committee to accept the removal of constitutional endorsement
for the Party's role as the vanguard of social development and the fount
of all political power 24 1 was, no doubt, the most significant swing thus
far - historical in its importance - in favor of pragmatism, in its contin-
uing interplay with ideology. But it also raises serious questions about
perestroika's future nature and direction, if not its future tout court.
It has been said that a camel is a horse designed by a committee.
Even if socialism itself should continue to be guaranteed by the Consti-
tution as the basis of the Soviet economic system, the participation of
the new Congress and of heterogeneous political groupings pursuing
their own agendas in the shaping ofperestroika is bound to have an effect
on each of its two aspects. Should, on the other hahid, the Communist
Party find itself in the minority, the future of socialism itself may be
affected. Gorbachev's suggestion that the Soviet federation be restruc-
tured by introducing the treaty principle, thus allowing for the existence
of diverse forms of federative ties,242 could affect the future of the USSR
240. Pravda, Nov. 26, 1989; Gorbachev, supra note 49, at 1-3.
241. See supra note 199.
242. See Gorbachev, 0 proekte platformy TsK k XXVIII S "ezdu partii [On the Draft Plat-form of the CPSU Central Committee for the XXVIIIth Party Congress] (report to the Plenum
of the CPSU Central Committee), Feb. 5, 1990, reprinted in Pravda, Feb. 6, 1990, at 2,
col. 2. For text of the "Platform," see Izvestiia, Feb. 13, 1990, at 2, col. 3 (the Russian
term dogovornyi, used in both texts, means both "based on a treaty," and "contrac-
tual"). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1990, at A16, col. 1. In the excerpts from the
"Platform," published in the New York Times, this clause was omitted. N.Y. Times,
Feb 14, 1990, at A12, col. 1.
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itself, as we know it today particularly if the constituent republics should
decide to take their fate into their own hands.
In presenting his vision of the new socialist society in the Soviet
Union and its role in the world, Gorbachev is a pragmatist, as well as a
revolutionary in the ideological sense. Both Gorbachevs are authentic.
The pragmatist is a political moderate, his revolutionary alter ego a Marx-
ist revisionist. His political courage is matched only by the political risks
he takes. Wisdom commands caution; hence these two quotations,
addressed to the pragmatist and the revolutionary alike:
"Die Geister die ich rief, die werd' ich nun nicht losl"
(The spirits whom I summoned, no longer can I exorcise theml)
(J. W. von Goethe, Faust)
and
"Revolutions are started by moderates and finished by extremists."
(B. dejouvenel, Du Pouvoir)
In a supreme feat of pragmatism and expediency, Mikhail S.
Gorbachev now aspires to become the radical who will complete the
revolution which he has started as a moderate. What will be the role of
ideology? - one wonders. When precisely did Gorbachev stop thinking
and acting po bol'hevistski (like a good Bolshevik), or did he?
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